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THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING 
The nineteenth annual meeting of the South Carolina His-
torical Association was held at the University of South Carolina 
and the Jefferson Hotel, Columbia, on April 2, 1949. Miss Lillian 
Kibler, President of the Association presided. 
At the morning session two papers were read and discussed: 
"Kiderlen-Waechter's Policy in the Bosnian Crisis" by C. Wal-
dron Bolen of Clemson College; and "Woodrow Wilson's Pan-
American Pact" by Charles H. Carlisle of Erskine College. 
The luncheon business meeting heard and accepted the Treas-
urer's report. Officers chosen for 1949-50 were: R. H. Wienef eld, 
President; Carl L. Epting, Vice-President; Thomas B. Alex-
ander, Secretary-Treasurer; Anne King Gregorie, Executive 
Committee Member. The Association adopted a resolution re-
questing the South Carolina Historical Commission to support 
publication of historical material on South Carolina in the an-
nual Proceedings of the Association in the amount of one hun-
dred dollars annually. 
Two papers were read and discussed at the afternoon session: 
"The Teaching of High School History-A Point of View" by 
Lucia Daniel, University High School; and "South Carolina Cot-
ton Mills and the Tillman Movement" by Gustavus G. William-
son, Jr., Johns Hopkins University. 
At the evening banquet session E. Baskin Wright of the 
University of South Carolina discussed "The Problem of Negro 
Education in the South". 
The Executive Committee continued Robert D. Ochs as edi-
tor of the Proceedings of the Association . 
.. 
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WOODROW WILSON'S PAN-AMERICAN 
PACT 
CHARLES H. CARLISLE 
I 
Woodrow Wilson, as President of the United States, in his 
message to the Congress on December 7, 1915, said: 
It presents them [the states of America] as in a very true 
and deep sense a unit in world affairs, spiritual partners, stand-
ing together, quick with common sympathies, and common ideals. 
Separated, they are subject to all the cross currents of the con-
fused politics of a world of hostile rivalries; united in spirit and 
purpose, they cannot be disappointed of their peaceful destiny. 
This is Pan-Americanism. It has none of the spirit of empire 
in it. It is the embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit 
of law and independence and liberty and mutual service.1 
It is the spirit of the above message which represents the 
very basis of Wilson's Pan-American policy. His whole plan 
was to unite the two continents in action and in thought. 
Through a spirit of cooperation, international trade would de-
velop to the benefit of all. He hoped that a feeling of confidence 
in the United States would be produced in the Latin-American 
states by his outspoken diplomacy and his repeated pronounce-
ments of our desire for peace and harmony.2 Wilson, on several 
occasions, stated his adherence to the principles of President 
Monroe. He stated that the United States still meant to defend 
the "common cause of international independence and of politi-
cal liberty in America".3 Wilson was contemplating the possi-
bility of converting the Monroe Doctrine from a national policy 
into a continental one in which all the American states might 
participate.4 Wilson stated in one of his addresses that he felt 
that the states of America might attain a new significance in 
the political history of the world by their increasing conscious-
ness of common political and economic problems.5 With this 
1 Albert Shaw, President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses (New 
York, 1918), p. 136. 
2 Harley Notter, The Origin of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson 
(Baltimore, 1937), p. 224. 
3 William S. Robertson, History of the Latin-American Nations (New 
York, 1932), p. 735. 
4 Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 
(New York, 1928), II, 933. 
5 Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West, The Foreign Policy of Wood-
row Wilson, 1913-1917 (New York, 1918), p. 75. 
(3) 
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policy of cooperation in all affairs it is not surprising that a 
plan of union should arise. 
It was only a few days after Wilson had made an address 
in which he stated that the American people must be friends 
of their Latin-American neighbors on "terms of equailty and 
honor" that he was confronted with a proposal which, if car-
ried out, might have put his ideas into action.6 William Jennings 
Bryan, Secretary of State, wrote to the President on November 
5, 1913, enclosing a letter he had received from Representative 
Slayden of Texas.7 Congressman Slayden's letter has not been 
made public ;8 however, Bryan stated that Slayden's letter was 
an explanation of a resolution he had introduced in the House 
of Representatives for a treaty among the nations of this hemis-
phere.9 Wilson was greatly impressed by the proposal and hoped 
to give it more serious thought at a later date. At the time the 
complications of the Mexican situation held first place in his 
thoughts concerning his southern neighbors.10 Congressman 
Slayden's suggestion died in the House Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, but it had caused some to turn their thoughts in the 
direction of Pan-Americanism. 
A similar proposal was presented to Wilson in January, 
1914, by Perez Triana, former Columbian minister to Great 
Britain, but it met a somewhat similar fate.n 
It remained for Wilson's advisor and close personal friend, 
Colonel E. M. House of Texas, to present the proposal for a 
league of American states before any concrete action was taken. 
House had watched the failure of European diplomacy before 
the outbreak of World War I. He realized that a system of 
international cooperation was needed among the Americas-
not in the distant future--but then.12 It was on the occasion of 
a visit by the President that House on November 15, 1914, 
"urged the President to turn from domestic affairs and take up 
the problem of 'welding together of the two western con-
tinents' "13 A month later, on December 16, 1914, House pre-
sented an additional reason for this union. This league of Ameri-
6 Address of President Wilson to the Southern Commercial Congress 
at Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, 1913. Shaw, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
7 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (New York, 
1931), IV, 285. 
8 Notter, op. cit., p. 273. 
9 Baker, op. cit., p. 285. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Notter, op. cit., p. 281; Baker, op. cit., p. 285. 
12 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Cambridge, 
1926), I, 207. 
13 Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 
1890-1920 (Baltimore, 1942), p. 322. 
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can republics would serve as an embryo society of nations. 
Wilson was captivated by the idea. The Western World would 
set an example for the European nations to follow at the con-
clusion of hostilities.14 Wilson hoped that the New World might 
aid the Old World after the war by furnishing leadership in 
the making of a lasting peace and by showing that it had learned 
the value of cooperation among nations.15 
Colonel House put into writing this desire for a union of 
American states in a letter to the President on November 30, 
1914, and followed this by an interview on December 16, in con-
nection with this proposal. His idea was for a loose organiza-
tion of American republics which would set up machinery for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes and, most of all, guarantee 
security from aggression. The New World had seen so many 
revolutions in which foreign manufacturers supplied the mu-
nitions of war to those in revolt, that House suggested that 
"government ownership of munitions of war" be included.16. 
Wilson then wrote his first two points: 
1st. Mutual guaranties of political independence under repub-
lican form of government and mutual guaranties of territorial in-
tegrity. 
2nd. Mutual agreement that the Government of each of the con-
tracting parties acquire complete control within its jurisdiction of 
manufacture and sale of munitions of war.17 
A copy of the two points was given to House to use in his 
interviews with the A.B.C. Ambassadors.ls It seemed expedient 
to begin negotiations with these most important Latin-Ameri-
can nations. 
The first of these points was a combination of House's sug-
gestion and Wilson's own ideas. It was here that almost the 
exact wording of Article X of the League of Nations Covenant 
originated.19 This gives the Pact a special significance. 
The second of these points, concerning munitions of war, 
which had been a part of Wilson's peace program in August, 
1914, was now being applied to his Latin-American neighbors. 
Possibly the difficulties which had been encountered in subduing 
14 Notter, op. cit., p. 374. 
15 Ibid., pp. 459-460. 
16 Seymour, op. cit., pp. 208-209. 
17 Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
18 Ibid., A.B.C. Powers are Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. 
19 Ibid., p. 210. 
Article X of the League of Nations Covenant: 
The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as 
against external aggression and territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggres-
sion or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council 
shall advise upon the means by which this obligation 1:Jhal! g~ f1,1lfiUe<!, 
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the revolutions in Santo Domingo, because of the work of mer-
chants in Haiti in selling munitions and arms, caused this point 
to receive due consideration.2Cl 
As Wilson began his administration, he set up certain ob-
jectives for his New World policy. He wished to uphold and ex-
pand the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, to accentuate the 
United States' opposition to aggressive expansion, to make the 
Western Hemisphere a place of free, self-governed people 
friendly to the United States, and to work for peace. The Pact 
was an attempt to fulfill these predetermined objectives.21 
Wilson preferred that the negotiations be carried on by 
House rather than by Secretary of State Bryan, but felt that the 
latter must be informed of the plan. Bryan did not place too 
much importance on the idea as he felt that his "cooling-off" 
treaties with most of the Latin-American republics were suf-
ficient. House sent Bryan periodic reports on his progress.22 
House was not sure that Wilson would have a chance to "play 
a great and beneficent part" in the European conflagration, but 
Wilson might succeed in setting up a world example of co-
operation and goodwill in the Americas.23 Colonel House ex-
pressed his opinion on the importance of the Pact in a letter to 
Wilson: 
This is a matter of such far-reaching consequences that I feel 
we should pay more attention to it just now than even the Euro-
pean affair, for the reason that, if brought to a successful conclu-
sion, the one must have a decided influence on the other.24 
On December 19 House was successful in gaining inter-
views with the A.B.C. Ambassadors. Each one agreed to cable 
the proposal to his government and also to ask that it be ap-
proved.25 Replies were received from Brazil and Argentina on 
December 24 and 29 respectively. Da Gama, the Brazilian Am-
bassador, declared that both points of Wilson's proposal were 
agreeable to his government and revealed his own enthusiasm 
for the plan by ref erring to this as "an epoch-making negotia-
tion" .26 Ambassador Naon of Argentina stated that his govern-
ment gave its endorsement to the proposal and, like Da Gama, 
Naon expressed personal enthusiasm for the plan. He said, "It 
will be such a great accomplishment that there will be nothing 
20 Notter, op. cit., p. 375. 
21 Ibid., pp. 375-376. 
22 Seymour, op. cit., pp. 210-211. 
23 Ibid., p. 209. 
24 Ibid., p. 215. 
25 Ibid., pp. 212-214. 
26 Ibid., p. 214. 
~ 
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he [Wilson] can ever do afterwards that can approach it in 
importance."27 
Chile's reply to House's proposal did not come until January 
21, 1915. The boundary disputes with Bolivia and Peru were 
the reasons for this hesitancy. Chile was not satisfied that pro-
vision would be made for such disputes.28 Chile's reply was am-
biguous, but it was not accepted for what it was worth in hopes 
that it would lead to something better.29 
Since all treaties to which the United States is a member 
must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, it seemed 
wise that the Senators' opinion should be obtained before pro-
ceeding further. Wilson consulted Senator James M. Stone, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 
found him quite sympathetic. Stone was also of the opinion 
that the Senate would be willing to endorse the plan.30 
House and Wilson came to an understanding on two impor-
tant points in regard to procedure. First, they agreed that there 
should be only one convention to which all the republics would 
agree instead of making twenty-one different treaties. The sec-
ond point was to the effect that the A.B.C. Powers and the 
United States would carry the negotiations to a satisfactory 
conclusion before consulting the smaller republics.31 
Before House's departure on his special mission to Europe 
in January, 1915, the President turned more toward his Sec-
retary of State under whom the negotiations would fall in 
House's absence. Wilson, Bryan, and Robert Lansing, a mem-
ber of the State Department staff, met in a conference at which 
Bryan suggested that one article of the Pact should include the 
essence of his peace treaties. Wilson agreed and intended to 
formulate the article himself, but other pressing problems de-
manded his attention. On January 29 Wilson sent a partially 
written article to Bryan to complete. Bryan completed the ar-
ticle and submitted it to the President; whereupon, Wilson sent 
Bryan a complete copy of the four draft articles for the pro-
posed Pan-American Pact.32 Copies of these articles were also 
sent to the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean Ambassadors to 
be forwarded to their respective governments.33 
Article I provided for the guarantee of territorial integrity 
27 Ibid., p. 215. 
28 Calicott, op. cit., p. 324. 
29 Seymour, op. cit., pp. 217-218. 
30 Ibid., pp. 216-217. 
31 Ibid., p. 216. 
32 Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-
1920 (Washington, 1940), II, 471-472. 
33 Ibid., p. 473. 
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and of common political independence under republican forms of 
government. Arbitration of disputes between nations with a time 
limit on the settlement was covered by Article II. Article III 
would pledge each nation to control the manufacture and sale of 
munitions of war within its boundaries to prevent the sale and 
shipment of such munitions to other countries. The principle of 
Bryan's peace treaties was incorporated into the Pact as Ar-
ticle IV.34 
For the next six months while House, the chief protagonist 
of the Pact, was in Europe the Pact was stalemated. Wilson, 
who was too busy with other matters, turned the plan over to 
the imaginative Bryan. Only one goal presented itself to Bryan 
and that was to keep the New World nations out of the European 
conflict-a goal which later caused his break with Wilson and 
his resignation. The little assistance to the Pact that Bryan 
did give was to further his desire for preservation of the neutral 
rights of the countries of the Western Hemisphere in the war 
and to have some influence in bringing peace to the world.as 
On March 8, Bryan made a report to Wilson in which he 
gave the reaction of the A.B.C. Powers to the four articles sub-
mitted to them. Brazil was in accord with all phases of the propo-
sition except on arbitration. Argentina was behind the pro-
gram one hundred per cent. No word had been received from 
Chile.36 
Wilson felt that once the approval of Argentina and Brazil 
was secured the Pact should be put through without waiting 
on Chile. Like Bryan, Wilson thought the Pact should be so 
drawn as to allow nations to enter later if they did not choose 
to do so then. He felt that if several of the larger states and 
a number of the smaller states signed, Chile would fall in line. 
In regard to Brazil, he asserted that the main point was that 
Brazil accept the program in principle and then some arrange-
ment could be worked out in regard to the arbitration provision.37 
Almost a month later the first word was received from the 
Chilean Government concerning the four articles. Here the first 
serious opposition developed. Chile's reply was in the form of 
a counterproposal; and the Chilean Government opposed the 
time limit on arbitration of disputes, the guarantee of repub-
lican form of government, and the guarantee of territorial in-
34 Jbid., pp. 472-473. 
35 Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State and 
Their Diplomacy (New York, 1929), X, 19-21. 
36Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, II, 473-474. 
37 Ibid., p. 475. 
.. 
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tegrity, plus other minor technical matters.38 
Wilson advised Bryan to go ahead with the Pact in such 
form as would be agreeable to Argentina and Brazil. If Chile 
desired to enter now or later, she could do so. Wilson felt that 
any alteration in the provision in order to meet Chile's desires 
would mean the destruction of the value of the Pact.39 
A very lengthy reply to Chile's counter proposal was sent 
to the Chilean Ambassador by Bryan with Wilson's endorse-
ment. He closed his communication by expressing the hope 
that Chile would join in the Pact at the same time as the others.40 
Although Wilson's time was consumed by his fight for the 
rights of neutrals in an ever-threatening war, he did give en-
couragement to the Pact on various occasions. On March 29, 
1915, he told a number of Latin-American dignitaries: 
... we are rapidly approaching a day when the Americas will 
draw together as they have never drawn together before, and ... 
it will be a union, not of political ties, but of understanding and 
mutual helpfulness.41 
II 
On June 9, 1915, Bryan resigned his post in the cabinet 
over a difference of opinion with Wilson on the attitude that 
the Government should take toward the German Empire. On 
that day the Pan-American Pact ended its first phase. It had 
seen a period of progress under House and one of decline un-
der Bryan. With the rise of Lansing from a lesser post in the 
State Department to the Secretaryship on June 23, 1915, the 
Pact started on its second period of progress and decline. 
The appointment of Lansing as Secretary of State very near-
ly coincided with the return of Colonel House from Europe. 
House had to inform Lansing of all the details concerning the 
Pact. Lansing knew very little about the proposed plan and 
knew of nothing on file in the State Department. Once informed 
of previous ·communications concerning the Pact, with the en-
couragement of House, Lansing put forth a strong effort to attain 
success.42 
During the first week of October, 1915, Wilson, Lansing, 
and House made their plans for further negotiations. It seemed 
necessary to change the provision concerning the manufacture 
and sale of arms and munitions if it was to prove acceptable. 
38 Ibid., pp. 476-478. 
39 Ibid., p. 479. 
40 Ibid., pp. 481-484. 
41 Notter, op. cit., p. 398. 
42 Bemis, ed., op. cit., X, 111-112; Seymour, op. cit., pp. 222-223; For-
eign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, II, 486-488. 
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According to the previous plan, the goernment was to control 
this industry. This provision was changed to "an automatic em-
bargo on munitions in case of revolutionary attack upon an 
existing government."43 , 
When this proposal with its changes was presented to the 
Argentine Ambassador, he stated that "there would be consider-
able objection to the arbitration provision in the second article 
in that it placed a time limit upon the settlement of disputed 
territorial claims". The next day N aon presented a counter pro-
posal-that the time limit be omitted. Wilson felt that this 
new article was distinctly inferior to the original. He would 
agree to the removal of the time limit only if it were stated that 
the settlement must be made as soon as possible.44 
Lansing saw the Chilean Ambassador on October 27 and 
convinced him of the necessity for the guarantee of political 
independence. Suarez blamed his earlier objection to this pro-
vision on Bryan's presenting it "with practically no explana-
tion as to the meaning".45 Because of its territorial dispute with 
Peru, Chile wished the time limit on settlement of disputes re-
moved under all conditions.46 
In a letter to the President, Lansing stated that the first 
proposition "is the essence of the compact and if we can secure 
his [Suarez] adhesion to that we can, in all probability, remove 
anything objectionable in the other propositions".47 
Lansing immediately began a general revision of the vari-
ous provisions in accordance with the desired changes.48 Wilson 
approved this new draft, which he considered the best which 
could be obtained. The revised draft was presented to the A.B.C. 
Ambassadors. Naon and Da Gama approved "cordially" and 
Suarez gave "his personal endorsement".49 Lansing was con-
vinced that the Chilean Ambassador would do all in his power 
"to secure favorable action by his government".w 
With the main objections . of the A.B.C. Powers removed 
from the Pact, success seemed quite near.st For the first time 
the public was informed of the essence of the Pact when Presi-
dent Wilson addressed the Pan-American Scientific Conference 
43 Seymour, op. cit., p. 225. 
44 Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, II, 488-489. 
45 Ibid., pp. 489-491. 
46 Ibid., pp. 489-490. 
47 Ibid., p. 491. 
48 Seymour, op. cit., pp. 233-234. 
49 Callcott, op. cit., pp. 326-328. 
60 Seymour, op. cit., p. 226. 
61 Notter, op. cit., p. 453. 
.. 
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on January 6, 1916.52 He spoke first of the desirability of friend-
liness and cooperation among all the American states and then 
emphasized the chief features of the administration's Pan-Amer-
ican program.53 In speaking of the Pact, Wilson said: 
And latterly there has been a very frank interchange of views 
between the authorities in Washington and those who represented 
the other States of this hemisphere, an interchange of views charm-
ing and hopeful, because based upon an increasingly sure apprecia-
tion of the spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen 
have seen that if America is to come into her own, into her legiti-
mate own, in a world of peace and order, she must establish the 
foundation of amity so that no one will hereafter doubt them.54 
Wilson then stated in brief the contents of the various articles of 
the proposed Pact. 
The American missions in the various Latin-American na-
tions were informed of the proposals and instructed to "express 
the interest taken in this proposal by the President of the 
United States and the hope of this government that a treaty 
to this end may be signed by all the American Republics".55 
In December, 1915, House was sent on another mission to 
Europe where he remained until March, 1916. During this time 
he did not forget the Pan-American Pact. Conversations were 
held with the Chilean Ambassador to Great Britain, the British 
Foreign Minister, and members of the British Parliament. House 
desired British support, and even considered the possibility of 
the participation of Canada in the Covenant. Up until this time, 
only independent nations had been included.56 The British lead-
ers consulted by House thought it best for Britain to wait for 
a more favorable opportunity before making a public statement. 
House kept in mind this possibility of including Canada in 
the Pact. On June 18, 1916, he suggested to Wilson that the 
phrase "republican form of government" be changed to read 
"existing forms of government", since this would be necessary 
before allowing foreign possessions to join.57 This suggestion 
was given no further thought as complications had already 
arisen to halt the good progress which had been made. 
It was not long after Wilson's optimistic speech to the Scien-
tific Conference that new difficulties began to develop. Brazil had 
expressed complete accord with the proposals in December, 1915, 
52 Seymour, op. cit., p. 227. 
53 Robinson and West, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 
64 Scott, op. cit., p. 160. 
55 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington, 1925), 
pp. 3-4. 
56 Seymour, op. cit., p. 227. 
57 Callcott, op. cit., p. 330. 
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but by the latter part of January it became evident that in-
fluences were at work to defeat the purposes of the treaty. Ac-
cording to word received from Da Gama, Brazil was no longer 
enthusiastic over the idea.58 
Chile resumed its position as the chief opponent of the Pact 
in January, although Suarez had given great hopes to Lansing 
in December, in regard to Chile's position. The main objection 
this time was to Article III, which according to Chile, embodied 
the principle of the Bryan Peace Treaties and made arbitration 
compulsory. The formal reply to the revised draft of the Pact 
came from Chile on March 9, 1916. Since it continued along 
this same line, Wilson was now convinced that it would be well 
to go ahead without Chile.59 
House suggested to Wilson that the services of Henry P. 
Fletcher be used in completing the Pact. Fletcher had offered 
to handle the negotiations in the fall of 1915, when he was am-
bassador to Chile. He was well versed on Latin-American re-
lations and was willing to assume this new responsibility al-
though he had recently been appointed ambassador to Mexico. 
The suggestion was followed and Lansing turned the negotia-
tions over to Fletcher.so 
Fletcher was confronted with the same problems. He had 
the whole-hearted support of the smaller nations, but as Wilson 
and House strengthened their views of the Pact as a basis for 
a world-wide program, the larger American republics showed 
that their interests were in "private objectives" instead of 
"world principles". 61 
The Argentine Ambassador was not willing to sign, and 
Brazil did not approve of proceeding without Chile. Chile still 
remained definitely and decidedly opposed to the treaty. Fletch-
er's opinion was that the treaty should not be pushed without 
Chile unless Argentina and Brazil favored such. He feared 
that Chile would turn to other countries in finance and trade 
and gradually would become hostile toward the United States.62 
Then the tense situation which developed between Mexico 
and the United States halted all progress on the Pact. Villa, 
who was opposing the Carranza regime in Mexico, used his 
position as a "liberal patriot" to further his bandit raids. On 
March 8, 1916, he raided Columbus, New Mexico, killing seven-
teen American citizens. The United States Government im-
58 Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, II, 493-494. 
69 Ibid., p. 494. 
60 Ibid., p. 495; Callcott, op. cit., p. 328. 
61 Callcott, op. cit., pp. 329-330. 
62 Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, II, 496-497 • 
.. 
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mediately sent Pershing to suppress Villa. When Pershing's 
troops crossed into Mexican territory, the Carranza Govern-
ment resorted to verbal and military retaliation. War seemed 
imminent. Under these conditions the Latin-American nations 
would not sign the Pact and the United States could not push 
the matter without leaving the impression that we wished it 
for our own good and not for the good of all the American re-
publics. During the summer of 1916, negotiations for the Pact 
were abandoned.63 
By September the Mexican crisis had eased and Argentina 
was ready to sign again. Chile, however, continued her op-
position and became more and more disinterested in the idea. 
The once enthusiastic Brazil was still reluctant.64 
The last mention of the Pact made by House in his diary 
was on October l, 1916. No doubt he saw that success was im-
possible at that time.65 
Upon the entrance of the United States into World War I in 
April, 1917, Lansing questioned the advisability of signing the 
Pact, but the Brazilian Government became quite anxious to 
sign as the Pact would give that country an excuse to go to war 
against Germany. The Pact might have brought some of the 
smaller republics into the war on the side of the United States, 
but Lansing thought that that ·might be more of a liability than 
an asset. 66 
It was only a matter of a few months before the Adminis-
tration was so busily engaged in the war that the idea of the 
Pact for the American states was dropped. The idea was not 
dead, however, as it was to be expanded later into the League 
of Nations.67 
III 
Why had the Pact failed in the New World? There were 
many complications which led to its abandonment. The strong-
est opposition had come from Chile; and therefore it received 
and should receive a major portion of the blame for the failure. 
It was Chile's objection that halted progress from the very 
beginning. The fact that the Tacna-Arica boundary dispute was 
in question was responsible for Chile's objection. She refused 
63 Seymour, op. cit., pp. 230-231. 
64 Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
65 Ibid., p. 232. 
Sumner Welles feels that the American people would have rejected 
the Pact had the approval of the A.B.C. Powers been secured. Welles, 
op. cit., pp. 933-934. 
66 Foreign Relations, The Lansing Pap<:rs, 1!)14-1920, II1 498, 
67 Callcott, op. cit., p. 331. · 
).;.,. ~. 
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to join any union which would restrain her selfish desires to 
maintain control of these two Peruvian provinces.68 This caused 
Chile to oppose the arbitration section with its time limit on 
settlements and the guarantee of territorial integrity. Chile 
should be blamed, also, for her hesitancy in replying to the 
various proposals and alterations made for her benefit. 
Probably one weakness in the negotiations was the fact that 
so many different individuals played a directing role. Besides 
the overall direction of Wilson, the Pact passed through the ne-
gotiating hands of House, Bryan, Lansing, and Fletcher. Of 
course, House was supposed to be the actual director of the pro-
ceedings, but if the matter were of as great importance as Wil-
son said, he would have placed it in the hands of an official-
most probably, the Secretary of State. Even politics may have 
contributed to the def eat of the plan. Wilson was never an ad-
mirer of Bryan's policies and had appointed him to the cabinet 
for political reasons. He may have realized that Bryan would 
not push the matter if it were placed in his hands. Wilson left 
the program to the man he probably would have liked to have 
had as Secretary of State. 
Over a long period of years the Latin-American nations 
had come to look upon the "colossus of the North" with fear 
and suspicion. Although assurances were given from time to 
time that the United States had no desire other than to protect 
its neighbors, they could not help but wonder, after seeing the 
American policy of intervention in some of the smaller states. 
This Pact appeared to them only as an excuse for United States 
intervention in domestic affairs.69 
In spite of the failure of completing the Pact, it became the 
foundation upon which Wilson based his most important work 
for world peace-the League of Nations. Wilson revealed this 
when he addressed a group of Mexican editors in June, 1918: 
The whole family of nations will have to guarantee to each 
nation that no nation shall violate its political independence or its 
territorial integrity. That is the basis-the only conceivable basis 
-for the future peace of the world, and I must admit that I was 
anxious to have the States of the two continents of America to 
show the way to the rest of the world as to how to make a peace.70 
The first proposition of the Pact, as has already been stated, 
was used in almost its original wording in Article X of the 
68 Charles Edmond Akers, A History of South America, 1854-1904 (New 
York, 1912), pp. 402-403. 
69 John Holladay Latane, A History of American Foreign Policy (New 
York, 1934), pp. 650-661. 
70 Earl Willis Crecraft, "A League of Nations in the Making", New 
York Times, Dec. 2, 1918, p. 12, col. 7, 
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League Covenant. The League members did not have to main-
tain a "republican form of government", but they had to have 
a government "based upon the consent of the governed". The 
League met the problem in regard to the "exportation of arms" 
by the power to control this trade in countries where is seemed 
necessary. The World Court was set up to settle international 
disputes. This paralleled the Pact's provision for arbitration.71 
71 Ibid. 
It is true that the League of Nations failed, but not because 
of the principles involved, but because they were not defended. 
Once again the people of the world are placing their highest 
hopes for the maintenance of peace in a world organization-
the United Nations. If one can visualize the proposed Pan-
American Pact as a milestone along the difficult road which 
mankind has been traveling in search of lasting peace and 
international cooperation, the true significance of the Pact will 
have been grasped. 
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KIDERLEN-WAECHTER'S POLICY 
IN THE BOSNIAN CRISIS 
C. WALDRON BOLEN 
Although historians are not in complete accord on the di-
vision of responsibility for World War I, they have accepted 
the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans as the major cause 
of the conflict. Germany's responsibility has been difficult to 
assess because the documents reveal the men in the Wilhelm-
strasse playing a double game with Vienna. Having been con-
vinced, after the Italian disloyalty at Algeciras, that the Triple 
Alliance was not solid, the directors of German policy believed 
their own security rested on the preservation of Austria as 
a great power. Consequently the policies of the ally had to be 
supported, even to the point of war. On the other hand, because 
this support indicated encouragement for Austria's expansionist 
aims in the Balkans, the Germans tried to exercise a restraining 
influence in Vienna. This diplomatic pattern of guiding a policy 
in two directions at the same time was shaped by Chancellor 
Buelow and Kiderlen-Waechter during the Bosnian annexation 
crisis. Because of his wide knowledge of Balkan affairs, the lat-
ter was summoned from Bucharest to head the foreign office, 
in November, 1908, when Schoen, the permanent secretary, be-
came ill. 
Kiderlen was one of the last of those young diplomats who 
began their careers under Chancellor Bismarck. He had served 
as counselor or secretary in the embassies at Copenhagen, St. 
Petersburg, Paris, and Constantinople. Afterwards, the old 
Chancellor recalled him to Berlin, and appointed him to accom-
pany the young Kaiser, William II, on his cruises aboard the 
Hohenzollern. William soon became fond of Kiderlen, whose 
talent as a narrator of amusing stories and smutty jokes was 
always in demand. Bismarck's dismissal and the resignation 
of other members of the service hastened the young diplomat's 
rise to a position of influence. In fact, Holstein, Marschall, and 
Kiderlen were largely responsible for dropping the Reinsurance 
Treaty with Russia. But Kiderlen's star soon set. After filling 
the position of minister to Hamburg and later to Copenhagen, 
he was sent off to Bucharest because of his indiscreet remarks 
about the Kaiser. As minister to Rumania, which post he held for 
ten years. Kiderlen had ample opportunity to become schooled 
in Balkan politics. Moreover, on two occasions he relieved am-
• 
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bassador Marschall at Constantinople, where he obtained con-
cessions for the Bagdad Railway and prevented the other am-
bassadors from forcing Turkey to adopt administrative reforms 
in Macedonia. He also maintained Germany's influence at the 
Porte during the Young Turk Revolution of July, 1908. 
When Kiderlen arrived in Berlin to take over the foreign 
office, the Bosnian crisis was a month old. Aehrenthal and Izvol-
ski, the foreign ministers of Austria and Russia respectively, 
had planned a bilateral move in the Balkans before the Young 
Turks could strengthen their empire. The Austrian announce-
ment of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October, 
however, caught the Russians empty-handed. Izvolski had not 
had time to prepare the ground for his part of the bargain, 
namely, the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. To 
save face, he now demanded a conference of the powers, which 
should approve alterations to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. 
Despite the fact that Germany had an unsettled diplomatic prob-
lem of her own, the Casablanca affair, she was staunchly sup-
porting her ally. At first the Kaiser wanted the annexation edict 
withdrawn, but the Chancellor won him over with the argument 
that this action might drive Austria into the camp of the entente 
powers.1 Picking up the diplomatic reins here, Kiderlen seconded 
Buelow's point of view. Since his appointment was temporary, 
he complained to his blond mistress, Frau Kypke, that he was 
supposed to make the cart float again and then depart.2 
In order to emerge from the crisis with a diplomatic victory, 
Kiderlen realized that the Central Powers would have to main-
tain a solid front. He therefore instructed Ratibor, the German 
minister in Belgrade, to participate in representations by the 
powers in the interest of peace ;3 but under no conditions would 
he accept the British proposal for like overtures in Vienna.4 To 
insure the desired degree of solidarity, the German secretary 
also began to check more closely on Aehrenthal's activities. Un-
doubtedly this procedure irritated the Austrian, who was re-
ported to have been pleased when Schoen returned to the office. 
"Naturally," remarked Kiderlen, "the first violin will now be 
1 Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friedrich 
Thimme, ed., Die Grosse Politik der Europaeischen Kabinette, 1871-1914: 
Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswaertigen Amtes (Berlin, 
1922-1927), XXVI, 111-114; cited hereafter as G. P. 
2 Ernst Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter der Staatsmann und Mensch, Brief-
wechsel und N achlass ( Berlin, 1925), II, 12. 
3 G. P., XXVI, 267-268, 272; L. Bittner, A. F. Pribram, H. Srbik, 
and H. Uebersberger, ed., Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bos-
nischen Krise 1908 ois zum Kriegsausbmch 1914 (Vienna, 1930), I, 459-
460; cited hereafter as 0.-U. A. 
4 G. P. XXVI, 276-277. 
18 THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL AsSOCIATION 
played by Vienna instead of by us."5 On the advice of Holstein, 
now in retirement, the Chancellor retained Kiderlen in Berlin 
until the crisis was settled.6 Later events proved that this was 
an improtant decision for his future. 
The first step in dissolving the crisis was to get Turkey to 
accept the accomplished fact, for German commercial interests 
required good relations with the Porte. Notwithstanding the 
Russian and Serbian objections to the annexation, Turkey 
was the only power whose sovereign rights had been violated. 
The resentment of the Serbs was due largely to their disappoint-
ment in not being able to form a great Serbia, which would 
have included Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, Kiderlen im-
mediately began urging Austria to make a financial settlement 
with the Porte for the loss of the provinces.7 At the same time, 
he counseled moderation on all sides. Turkey was advised to 
negotiate with Austria and to remove the boycott on Austrian 
goods; England was asked to use her influence in Constantinople 
in favor of settlement; and Austria was warned not to break off 
diplomatic relations with Turkey.8 There was real cause for 
anxiety, for Marschall reported early in December that the 
Austro-Turkish tension was increasing, a condition which he 
attributed to Aehrenthal's refusal to negotiate a financial set-
tlement until the boycott was removed.9 Again Kiderlen urged 
the Austrian government to satisfy Turkey with a money com-
pensation. Evidence that he was displeased with Aehrenthal's 
use of German support is contained in the following statement 
to Vienna: 
We are standing loyally behind our ally and therefore have the 
right to be informed as to his [Aehrenthal's] intentions, in order 
not to be confronted with surprises. We have heard all kinds of 
things from third parties about Aehrenthal's maneuvers in the 
Turkish situation; we must receive official notice of these. Other-
wise, we shall be told some day by the other powers that we had 
refused to advise Austria-Hungary to make concessions which had 
been proposed to her. V{e dare not allow ourselves to be put in such 
a false position.10 
This pressure had the desired effect, and, with England using 
her influence in Constantinople, the Austro-Turkish agreement 
was completed and formally signed on February 26 of the new 
5 J aeckh, K iderlen-Waechter, II, 11. 
6 H. Rogge, ed., Friedrich von Holstein Lebensbekenntnis in Brie/en an 
Eine Frau (Berlin, 1932), pp. 328-329. 
7 0.-U. A., I, 452-453, 457. 
8 G. P., XXVI, 448-449. Reports had come to Berlin that Pallavicini 
was to be recalled. 0.-U. A., I, 513. 
9 G. P., XXVI, 455-456. 
10 Ibid., 459. 
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year. Turkey acknowledged the annexation, and received in re-
turn a money compensation, commercial advantages, and the 
. renunciation of Austria's rights in the Sanjak.11 
With Turkey satisfied, Germany's next move was to get Ser-
bia and Russia to accept the annexation, a more difficult task. 
Kiderlen's policy was based on the assumption that a stronger 
line would have to be taken to get the Slavic states to yield. 
Although he did not believe Russia would back Serbia's claims 
to the point of war, he advised the Austrians to minimize the 
danger from this source by enlisting Bulgaria on their side. Not 
only would this divide Russian sympathies, but Bulgaria would 
be an effective counterweight against Serbia.12 Military prepara-
tions, too, were in order, for Serbian nationalism was rising. 
Therefore, when Aehrenthal suggested that Conrad and Moltke, 
the chiefs of the Austrian and German staffs, exchange views 
on a possible European conflict, Buelow and Kiderlen agreed. 
Because Italy could not be relied on, an opinion confirmed by 
Count Monts from Rome, Kiderlen advised that she be left out 
of the conversations.13 By an exchange of letters, the military 
chiefs implemented their alliance with plans for cooperation 
in case of war with Serbia and Russia. 
Throughout the crisis Kiderlen stubbornly refused every pro-
posal for coercing Austria to appease Serbia by a territorial 
or other compensation. Moreover, in his opinion, Austria should 
not agree to a conference unless acceptable conditions were 
guaranteed beforehand.14 When Jules Cambon, the French am-
bassador, suggested that France and Germany offer their serv-
ices in St. Petersburg and Vienna respectively, Kiderlen ad-
vised rejection. "We have no cause," he said, "to influence our 
ally for mediation, nor is there any reason for helping Izvolski 
out of his embarrassing situation."15 A similar proposal by Eng-
land was likewise refused. Kiderlen told Cambon and Goschen, 
the British ambassador, that action for liquidating the crisis 
should be taken at Belgrade rather than at Vienna, especially 
since the provocation was coming from Serbia. This action, he 
predicted, would be more effective if all of the powers, especially 
Russia, would participate.16 France and England were unwilling 
11 0.-U. A., I, 886; G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, ed., British Docu-
ments on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1927-1937), V, 638-
639; cited as B. D. 
12 Ibid., I, 530. Bulgaria had used this opportunity to proclaim her in-
dependence. 
13 G. P., XXVI, 338-339. 
14 Ibid., 458. 
15 Ibid., 592. 
16 Ibid., 608. 
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to accept this procedure; on the other hand, they refused to sup-
port Serbia's claims to territorial compensation, and advised the 
Russians to do likewise.17 Despite Izvolski's irritation when the 
French ambassador presented Kiderlen's plan, Russia, never-
theless, counseled Serbia to renounce her territorial demands 
and to appeal her case to the powers.18 
Kiderlen naturally hoped that Serbia would yield without 
further debate. If not, he believed a favorable solution could 
be forced, since Russia had not recovered from her war with 
Japan.19 This opinion was correct. The following week, a council 
of Russian ministers and generals decided that they were not 
prepared to intervene in the event of an Austro-Serbian con-
flict.20 When the Serbs failed to include acceptance of the annex-
ation in their note to the powers, the Germans began planning 
for the day when stronger action would be required.21 Resorting 
to the press, Kiderlen undertook to influence German opinion 
to this point of view.22 On being warned by Cambon that this 
chauvinistic press might cause trouble and create the impres-
sion that Germany did not care if war ensued, Kiderlen replied 
that this impression would be quite wrong, and concluded blunt-
ly: "We certainly do not want war-as Russia would be sure to 
get a beating and that would mean a revolution followed by a 
republic. That would not suit our book at all. Especially as we 
are not ready for one ourselves yet."23 Climaxing the war of 
nerves, Austria dispatched fifteen battalions to her southern 
frontier ;24 for Aehrenthal, too, had judged the Serbian note un-
acceptable.25 
At this point the Russians unwittingly afforded Buelow and 
Kiderlen the opportunity to intervene more directly to effect 
a solution favorable to the Central Powers. On March 14, Count 
Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, asked the Chancellor to 
advise Aehrenthal against publishing the documents pertaining 
to the original bargain. Izvolski did not want France and Eng-
land to know that he had agreed to the annexation in return for a 
promise of support for opening the Straits to Russian warships. 
17 B. D., V, 637-638; B. De Siebert and G. A. Schreiner, ed., Entente 
Diplomacy and the World (New York, 1921), pp. 231-232. 
18 B. D., V, 627-628; Siebert, Entente Diplomacy, pp. 235-236. 
19 J aeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, 25. 
20 G. P., XXVI, 672; 0.-U. A., II, 120; Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The An-
nexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909 (Cambridge, 1937), pp. 188-189. 
21 G. P., XXVI, 651, 652-653; B. D., V, 672, 673. 
22 E. M. Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914 (New York, 
1938), p. 622; B. D., V, 673. 
23 B. D., V, 678. 
24 G. P., XXVI, 657, 659; 0.-U. A., II, 115. 
25 0.-U. A., II, 79-80. 
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Buelow consented to mediate on condition that Izvolski would 
advise Serbia to be quiet.26 With Kaiser's approval, Kiderlen then 
drafted the German plan for liquidating the crisis. First of 
all, the powers should ratify the annexation by an exchange of 
notes with Vienna. Russia would then advise the Serbs to ac-
cept the annexation. Should Izvolski refuse this procedure and 
continue to withhold recognition, the Germans stated that they 
would have to let matters take their course.27 From Austria's 
point of view, the German plan seemed adequate. It provided 
for recognition. of the annexation without a conference of the 
powers, and at the same time, it deprived Serbia of legal grounds 
for hoping that the fait accompli would be overturned.~ 
The Russians were not ready to accept the German plan un-
conditionally. Izvolski still desired a guarantee that a conference 
would be held to pass upon the annexation.29 He was indeed in a 
tight spot. Acceptance would mean defeat and humiliation for 
Pan-Slavism everywhere; refusal would leave the threat of 
an Austro-Serbian war. His answer to the Germans was, there-
fore, conciliatory and conditional.30 The Kaiser was extremely 
critical of the tone and content of the document,31 and Kiderlen 
told Szoegyeny, the Austrian ambassador, that he believed Bue-
low would force Russia to give a clear and precise answer.32 This 
opinion was not mere speculation, for the minister was probably 
then composing the note which forced Izvolski to yield. On 
March 21, Pourtales, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, 
was instructed as follows : 
Tell Izvolski that we learn with satisfaction that he recognizes 
the friendly spirit of our proposal and appears willing to accept it. 
You will then inform M. Izvolski that we are ready to propose to 
the Austro-Hungarian government that it should ask the powers, 
on the basis of the Austro-Turkish agreement already communi-
cated to them, to consent to the elimination of article 25 of the 
Treaty of Berlin. But before we make this proposal to Austria-
Hungary, we must know definitely that Russia will give an affirma-
tive answer to the Austrian note and will declare, without any 
reservation, her formal agreement to the abolition of article 25. 
Your Excellency will therefore tell M. Izvolski in a positive man-
ner that we expect a precise answer-yes or no. We shall have to 
26 G. P., XXVI, 669; Bernhard von Buelow, Memoirs of Prince von 
Buelow (Boston, 1932), II, 447. 
27 G. P., XXVI, 670. 
28 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York, 1939), I, 
388-389. Schmitt believes the Germans were sincere in wishing to build a 
bridge for Russia's retreat. Annexation of Bosnia, pp. 187-188. 
29 Siebert, Entente Diplomacy, p. 255. 
30 G. P., XXVI, 691-692. 
31 Ibid. 
32 0.-U. A., II, 155. 
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consider any evasive, conditional, or unclear answer as a refusal. 
We would then draw back and let matters take their course; the 
responsibility for all further events would then fall exclusively 
on M. Izvolski, after we have made a final sincere attempt to help 
M. Izvolski clear up the situation in a manner acceptable to him.33 
The purpose of the note is clearly revealed in Kiderlen's 
own comments. Writing to a friend, he said: "I have finally 
succeeded in having clear and plain language used with Izvol-
ski. The Chancellor today signed my note to Pourtales at St. 
Petersburg for Izvolski."34 Later, when Kiderlen became perma-
nent head of the foreign office, he boasted to Take J onescu, 
a Rumanian minister: "I knew the Russians were not ready 
for war, that they would not go to war in any case, and I 
wanted to make what capital I could out of this knowledge. I 
wished to show them that Germany, which had been in Russian 
strings since 1815, was now free of them. Never would Schoen 
and Co. have ventured to do what I did on my own responsi-
bility."35 Since Kiderlen's position was hardly of more impor-
tance than that of an undersecretary, obviously he was exag-
gerating. In the last analysis, William and Buelow bore the re-
sponsibility for Germany's policy. 
Unquestionably Kiderlen was guilty of rattling the sword, 
but, since his note contained no time limit, it was hardly an ulti-
matum.36 With no other avenue open, the Russians accepted the 
German proposal. 37 Then Kiderlen sounded London, Paris, and 
Rome for their approval of the Austro-Turkish agreement and 
for their recognition of the annexation.38 With victory in sight, 
he now advised Aehrenthal not to accept a conference of the 
powers.39 On England's withholding her consent to this arrange-
ment,40 Kiderlen informed London that Serbia would never yield 
until the annexation had been recognized by the powers. Fur-
thermore, should Germany's plan be abandoned, he warned that 
she would refuse to accept the responsibility for further events:n 
On the following day, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign sec-
retary, informed the Austrians that England would cooperate 
with the other powers in the overture to Belgrade.42 Grey, how-
33 G. P., XXVI, 693-695; Schmitt, Annexation of Bosnia, pp. 194-195. 
34 J aeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, 26. 
35 Take Jonescu, Some Personal Impressions (London, 1919), p. 58. 
36 Schmitt, Annexation of Bosnia, pp. 196-197. 
37 G. P., XXVI, 702-703. 
38 Ibid., 703-704. 
39 0.-U. A., II, 187. 
40 B. D., V, 739; G. P., XXVI, 707-708. 
41 G. P., XXVI, 708-709. 
42B. D., V, 746-747; 0.-U. A., II, 203, 
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ever, did not answer the stiff German note, an omission which 
greatly displeased the Chancellor.43 
After the great powers had acted in concert in Belgrade, 
Serbia agreed to comply with their decision on the annexation. 
In addition, she promised to live on good relations with Austria 
and to restore her army to its normal footing.44 Because this 
statement of promises contained no guarantee for Serbia's fu-
ture conduct, Kiderlen personally deemed it inadequate. He 
could not shut his eyes to the possibility that the Serbs might 
sometime commit an act which would provoke Austria to war, 
and he told Goschen that, had he been in Aehrenthal's place, 
he would never have consented to a formula which contained no 
guarantee for the future. The minister would have preferred 
that Germany had incurred no responsibility for the action in 
Belgrade. 45 
The issues raised by the annexation were now all but settled. 
Thanks to Germany's support, a policy inaugurated by Bulow 
and forcefully executed by Kiderlen, Austria gained two more 
indigestible Slavic provinces. Yet this diplomatic victory was 
both costly and brief, for the passions aroused and the commit-
ments made did much to prepare the ground for World War I. 
A peaceful solution of the crisis was effected because Russia 
was unwilling, at this time, to support Serbia to the end. Fur-
thermore, after pouring cold water on Izvolski's aspirations for 
opening the Straits, France and England had restrained their 
associate. The Triple Entente was not yet "Balkanized." In 
forcing a solution of the crisis, Germany had acted also for 
peace. Austria and Russia might have let matters rest until 
Serbia had committed an act which would have brought war 
sooner. 
In subscribing to the principle that Germany's security 
rested on the preservation of Austria, the ally, Kiderlen realized 
that an element of risk was incurred. To minimize this danger, 
he counseled his government to remain the master and not the 
servant of the alliance.46 This would suggest that, whenever 
the pull from Vienna became too great, the ally would have to 
be restrained. At one point in the crisis, Buelow incited Austria 
against Serbia and Montenegro.47 The documents reveal no simi-
lar advice from Kiderlen; however, his activity during the whole 
crisis convinced Szoegyeny that he was one of Austria's strongest 
43 0.-U. A., II, 208. 
44 0.-U. A., II, 225; G. P., XXVI, 731. 
45 B. D., V, 765. 
46 J aeckh, K iderlen-Waechter, II, 11. 
47 0.-U. A., I, 606-611. 
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supporters in the German foreign office.48 This pattern of en-
couraging and, at times, restraining Austria was followed by 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen again during the 
first Balkan War of 1912, and finally by Bethmann and Jagow 
in July, 1914. The German people are well aware of the conse-
quences. 
48 0.-U. A., II, 314. 
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THE TEACHING OF HIGH SCHOOL 
HISTORY-A POINT OF VIEW 
LUCIA DANIEL 
I 
The purpose of this paper is to present a point of view to 
be considered by those who have a part in the preparation of 
prospective high school teachers of history. It is not intended as 
a treatise on what preparation or how this preparation should 
be given to these teachers in the making. The point of view 
to be discussed is (1) what product should result from teaching 
history in high school and (2) how these results may be secured. 
This teaching should influence the pupils in what they do, how 
they react to what others do, and how well they live. A thorough 
knowledge of history may in no small degree_ contribute to this 
living, but this knowledge alone may have little or no effect. 
There also should be an understanding of the facts whereby 
ideals and attitudes may be guided. Furthermore, both the un-
derstanding and the knowledge will function as desired when 
the pupils and their purposes are understood and given con-
sideration. Altogether this is a complicated order, but one de-
serving attention of those who even remotely have a part in the 
preparation of high school teachers. 
As for the pupils, no longer do we have the situation once 
prevalent when approximately three out of four high school 
graduates went to college. Today about three out of every four 
in a high school graduating class do not go on to college. We are 
aware that today we are approaching "general education". We 
are reaching the point where all of the boys and girls attend 
high school. The problem created by this growth has given us 
pupils with varying interests, outlooks, ideas, and vocational 
futures-an resulting in the dilemma of "universal high school 
education" or "selected high school education". Whether we like 
it or not, "universal education" is being forced upon us. The 
children are in school, and laws will not permit their elimination. 
Parents demand, state and nation encourage, politicians and 
many "respectable" educators insist that the high school serve 
all, irrespective of color, creed, ability, or interest. Thus a single 
point of view as to course offerings or curriculum opportunity 
is to make a fiasco of the whole business. 
In the past and in the present, many college or university 
administrative groups have considered secondary education 
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largely in terms of how best it could prepare pupils to meet col-
lege or university entrance requirements. It is chiefly in the 
last generation that secondary schools have been able to break 
away from rigid university and college controls. The newer 
emphasis upon vocational training and general education are 
being given a status equal in rank with that older emphasis 
upon the college course. 
The chief purpose of the high school in the United States 
is to prepare its pupils, whether they graduate or not, for 
citizenship responsibilities-to give them an understanding of 
their obligations and duties in the adult world. Therefore, there 
should be a general program of education for all pupils with 
specialized programs in which those of special ability will have 
the opportunity for developing their specialty. One such group 
would be the college preparatory pupils, but they would be only 
one such special group. 
Only about one-third of the boys and girls who enter our 
secondary schools graduate, and of those who graduate, only 
about one-fourth to one-third go to college. This ratio will prob-
ably increase in time. We must admit that while we do have 
a real obligation to the special college preparatory group, we 
have a far more pressing obligation to those who enter high 
school but leave before graduating and do not go to college. 
Since America's very future depends upon its educational sys-
tem, it is imperative that we realize the need for a realistic 
citizenship training program leading to a full life of civic re-
sponsibility. 
In our American schools we do much to teach the theory of 
democracy but too little to train pupils in habit and attitudes 
which will make them useful members of society, The school, 
next to the home, is held responsible for the abilities, interests, 
habits, attitudes, and traits which high school boys and girls at-
tain by the time they leave school, whether as graduates or not. 
It is generally assumed that the State supports public edu-
cation not only to give instruction in formal subjects however 
important these are, but, also to prepare boys and girls for the 
life they will find beyond school. Will they have the knowledge, 
the attitudes, and the interests which will help them deal with 
the problems which will confront them soon after they leave 
school? Social competence is an essential outcome of public edu-
cation, and in the words of Dr. Francis Spaulding, Commis-
sioner of Education of New York State, our schools ought "to 
be judged not so much by whether they succeed in 'covering' 
certain predetermined subjects as by their success in develop-
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ing socially significant abilities and in leading boys and girls 
to want to put those abilities to use".1 
The schools' effort to equip young people for citizenship 
should not stop with seeing that pupils "know the facts", for 
equally important are respect for the rights which democracy 
guarantees, and a concern that democratic government shall 
succeed. Hence, the schools' duty is two-fold: namely, to teach 
boys and girls the facts with which they need to be acquainted 
and to awaken in them a willingness to sacrifice personal in-
terests and comforts in the promotion of fairness and the gen-
eral welfare. 
Since high school boys and girls are the future adult mem-
bers of our society, it is important to ascertain whether or not 
they possess the qualities which will make them ready to meet 
the responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic state. This 
demands more than the important duties of voting, paying taxes, 
and obeying the law. It includes ability to get along with family, 
neighbors, and associates. We need young men and women who 
feel an urge to correct undesirable conditions in their communi-
ties, who understand the meaning of democracy and are loyal 
to its principles. 
Where does the teaching of high school history fit into this 
scheme? Many claim that history should make better citizens, 
and true it may, but knowledge of history alone may not do 
this unless ideals, attitudes, and habits are understood in terms 
of activity. More than imparting knowledge is necessary to an 
understanding. Do our schools give our young people a chance 
to develop the kinds of social competence needed to make them 
good citizens and successful workers? Do our schools teach di-
rectly and systematically about our own local communities and 
encourage young people in any significant thinking about f unda-
mental out-of-school social problems? 
It seems that a primary reason for the lack of success among 
young people in meeting these problems lies in the fact that 
the high schools give them insufficient chance to master im-
portant abilities which the world beyond school will require of 
them as citizens, taxpayers, and voters. The present educational 
program has supplied much academic information, but has ne-
glected to give pupils pertinent knowledge concerning imme-
diate problems and issues in their local communities, their op-
portunities for making a living, or the educational possibilities 
open to them when they leave school. 
1 Francis T. Spaulding, High School and Li,fe (New York, 1938), p. 4. 
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Legislatures and State Boards of Education have prescribed 
history, American history, as a requirement for high school 
graduation. By implication, this course falls in the category of 
general education rather than specialized, since all have to take 
it. There is little opportunity for specialized history in high 
school. To prospective teachers, this must be clearly understood. 
While there are those who prepare for a life of historical schol-
arship, of equal or greater urgency is the teaching of those who 
desire and need only elementary knowledge of history; these 
are numbered in the thousands while future historians are num-
bered in tens. History knowledge is important to be sure, but 
from this point of view, it is a means to an end, but cannot 
serve unless it becomes part of the end as well as the means. 
The prospective teacher must be a scholar, but more than 
a scholar, he must be an educator. The content of high school 
history courses is largely controversial. These issues must not 
only be known but they must be understood. So-called "dead 
issues" are often not dead at all; for example, the "lost cause" 
now raises its head again in the "states' rights" movement. 
Even though the history of former times is necessary to a 
proper understanding of the present, such study is not sufficient 
enough to equip citizens of today with the knowledge and atti-
tudes which they must have in order to possess a sympathetic 
understanding of our complex and constantly changing world, 
the future of which they will help to shape. Contemporary events 
must be studied as a means of developing lively and intelligent 
interest in world affairs. 
It has been only a few years since numerous educators spoke 
with admiration and mingled jealousy of the results which the 
Nazis in a few short years had achieved in indoctrinating the 
German youth in ideals and ideas of Nazism. The zeal found 
in Germany and in Italy and today in communist-dominated 
lands goes along with an authoritarian society, not one of which 
is democratic. Young people can be moved to a high state of 
excitement by the preparation for war or the prospect of con-
quering an enemy, but youth will not manifest these outward 
demonstrations of zeal in a society which emphasizes the con-
quering or solving of common problems. Such is our democratic 
society. Our greatest hope in America lies, not in an attempt 
to stimulate an artificial excitement about national objectives, 
but rather in the attempt to interest more and more people in 
the job of doing their civic duty. 
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II 
Where will the schools fit into this plan to promote a con-
tinuous and effective interest in the performance of civic duties? 
How are pupils to be encouraged to concern themselves with 
the problems of the day which call for informed and thought-
ful consideration? 
If today's schools are to perform their full responsibility to 
the young people under their direction, they must face two im-
portant factors : what shall we teach and how shall we teach, 
in other words, content and method. Not only must there be 
real constructive thinking on these two problems, but more im-
portant, action must follow-action in directing these young 
learners in straight thinking about the "American" way of life, 
and in helping them to grow into informed, thoughtful, respon-
sible citizens. This cannot be done effectively unless we permit 
the examination of controversial issues in our schools. Contro-
versy is a vital part of our democratic way of life and hence 
such issues belong in the school. One often hears people say 
that some issues are not controversial, which is to say, not sub-
ject to different interpretations. This in itself is an issue. Too 
often, when differences become significant and controversy takes 
on a fundamental nature, people become faint-hearted and wish 
to protect the young from such situations. 
Contemporary problems do belong in the classroom, but 
should not be dumped there. It is wrong for pupils to be made 
to feel that life is simple and peaceful so long as they study 
the three r's or even geography and history, but on rare or 
infrequent occasions it becomes exciting when they study is-
sues. Just as issues permeate the entire sphere of life, so they 
should permeate the curriculum. 
The American government and our American people are 
daily forced to deal with a large number of important questions 
-domestic and foreign. Under our system of government, a 
citizen cannot escape the obligation of meeting these issues. 
Whether it is the opinion expressed, the vote cast, or the cause 
supported, he is helping to create public opinion and to shape 
programs for action. Even when a citizen ignores an issue, he 
is helping to determine the outcome. The more of this group 
we have, the easier it is for a relatively small but highly or-
ganized pressure group to further its interests and to realize its 
solutions and objectives. 
Our American way of life demands a dynamic, changing so-
ciety. If a democracy is to survive as a democracy, it must ex-
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pect, anticipate. and welcome orderly changes, political, social, 
and economic. History has shown us that if such change is not 
possible through avenues of open discussion and the free ballot, 
it will then come by violent revolution. Since proposed or de-
veloping changes will precipitate controversy, democracy must 
provide skills and machinery for its citizens to think intelligently 
and express judgment concerning controversial topics. 
In our democracy, the school is regarded as the chief agency 
for the development of skilled, well-informed people and for 
the reconstruction of values. The school should provide for the 
realistic induction of young citizens to the methods of arriving 
at rational discussions about live issues which must be solved 
by popular will or consent. No other agency of society even 
approaches the school in ability to perform this function. The 
one universal institution in which democratic habits may be 
acquired by all is the public school. There is no better place for 
young people to prepare to meet real Iif e decisions. 
It has been necessary to d-eal with content and method 
separately, but this is not intended to imply that they are sepa-
rate. Let there be no conflict between content and method. Both 
are involved if we teach at all. Moreover, a third element is 
the pupil, his maturity, his intelligence, and his viewpoint. 
Any content or method attempted without a recognition of the 
persons to be taught will result in a hit and miss procedure 
with chance results. Perhaps this is not bad for the exceptional 
pupil who may get along somehow without a teacher, but it is 
bad for pupils in general. What method then is best to follow 
in teaching history classes? 
Problems and issues of present-day life have a tendency 
to be more meaningful, more alive, and of greater importance 
than those of other days. This is primarily true since contempo-
rary problems are in the process of solution while past contro-
versies, whether solved or unsolved, have lost much of their 
interest. 
When American history courses are organized around or 
are permeated with present-day problems, America's past is 
made meaningful to the present-for example, in foreign re-
lations we have the conflict between nationalism and internation-
alism; and the Civil War gives insight into the current struggle 
between agriculture and industrialism. Learning should be di-
rected toward a living problem, not old and cold topics. 
One needs not argue the importance of teaching debatable 
subjects. In teaching public problems one is bound to tackle 
something controversial, for that always happens in a democracy 
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when important questions come up for settlement. Out of these 
conflicts of opinion come compromises which are eventually 
enacted into law. 
In much of the subject matter of current history, pupils 
simply acquire information for there is nothing to debate, but 
when the controversial questions do arise, they should not be 
dodged but should be dealt with frankly. A teacher should make 
certain that the pupils understand the importance of and reason 
for considering these issues, and he should know how to hold 
the confidence of his class, even though considering some prob-
lems and declining to consider others. 
There are numerous criteria for judging a controversial is-
sue which may be studied in the classroom. These range from 
whether it is timely and interesting to whether it is relevant 
to the course in history and acceptable to the community as 
appropriate for school study. 
Assuming that a problem has been selected for study, what 
then becomes the teacher's part? While acting as the chairman 
or moderator, the teacher needs to do an expert job of defining 
the question at hand and of directing the discussion of the class 
to these concrete points. Further, the discussion must be kept 
to the points at issue until an opportunity for decision has been 
reached even if different points of view persist, or, in other 
words, until further argument carries no evidence. This is a 
hard task, for the tendency in pupil as well as in adult dis-
cussion is to drift away from the definite problem under con-
sideration. The teacher has an additional responsibility of de-
veloping skill in handling the timid as well as the loquacious 
pupil, and of knowing how and when to bring the discussion to 
a close. Parenthetically, a teacher may express a point of view 
provided he makes it clear that it is not to be forced on others, 
and is stated as a point of view and not as a fact. To the facts, 
the pupils and teachers should agree. In this way a lesson in 
distinguishing between fact and opinion is learned, for conflict-
ing opinions should be examined in a calm and rather analyti-
cal way. Thus by the time a pupil leaves high school, he should 
be fairly competent in the appraisal of opinion. He has a greater 
preparation for the adult responsibility of making tentative 
conclusions in the light of evidence and consistent with demo-
cratic principles and of keeping currently informed and stand-
ing ready to revise these tentative conclusions and to pursue a 
different course of action if new evidence is uncovered. 
It is desirable for a teacher to express his own opinions 
very seldom for pupils are inclined to accept his analyses as 
...,; 
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those of authority, particularly on issues where pupils have not 
already developed opinions. Even if a teacher tells his pupils 
that what he has said represents only his own point of view, his 
opinions will carry great weight and pupils will be inclined to 
follow his lead unless the question being discussed has to do 
with party politics. In such matters pupils are greatly influenced 
by what they hear at home and elsewhere. 
In our American education, we may expect our pupils to be 
indoctrinated in favor of democracy, thus we do not want them 
to get the idea that, whenever a difficult problem arises, they 
can expect someone else to give them the answers. If these 
young people are to display independence in years to follow, 
they should acquire the habit of free thought and decision 
while they are in school. The duty of the teacher is to see that 
pupils know the admitted facts, and that they are familiar with 
a variety of opinions. 
Let it not be assumed that this point of view carries the 
idea that just any teacher is capable of directing or guiding 
pupils in issue-discussions, for frequently issue-minded teachers 
are highly emotional individuals. Any teacher who guides af-
fectively the study of issues must first search out the numerous 
facts required in order to understand the problem. This fact-
finding procedure is rather laborious, but it is essential to know 
which facts have been tested, which are pure assumptions, which 
have been tainted with propaganda, or which facts are missing. 
Only after this can one begin discussing solutions. In a democ-
racy issues of State do rest eventually upon the will and content 
of the governed, so there are no issues which are not quite 
properly the business of public education. 
We are living in a period of suspicion, fear, and extremism, 
and many voices are raised against any realistic study of today's 
problems in the classroom. One charge against public schools 
is that teachers are trying to indoctrinate pupils with their own 
ideas-freedom through indoctrination, one might call it. How-
ever, if a teacher acts as a moderator, brings in all facts, 
permits freedom of discussion, and lets pupils form their own 
opinions or conclusions, then he indoctrinates possibly-but 
through freedom. 
III 
The preparation of teachers to meet the "general education" 
trend is of importance to each of us. It is highly desirable that 
research be included in the preparation for teaching, but re-
search alone is not enough. A prospective teacher must know 
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who are to be taught. Familiarization or acquaintance with pu-
pils, their environments, former schooling and future plans 
is important. 
A teacher should know what to teach-that is, the teacher 
should be capable of selecting appropriate content from a store 
of material: herein is the importance of scholarship for the 
teacher. Will the content be appropriate for the pupils who are 
taught? Will it consist of memorizations of names and dates 
or will it emphasize skills in the interpretation of data, appli-
cation of principles, evaluation of sources, and ability to gen-
eralize? 
A teacher should know how to arouse the pupil's interest in 
history. There should be a constant effort to show the connection 
between history and the events of our times. While the chrono-
logical approach is important, the horizontal approach is equally 
important. A pupil should be given an opportunity to discover 
how his own country looks to other nations, and to learn that 
relations between nations are in reality relations between human 
beings. 
A glance at any daily newspaper or any of the current 
magazines will reveal the wide range of domestic and foreign 
topics demanding the attention of an enlightened citizenry. 
A teacher should know how to encourage pupils to read widely, 
and to listen to newscasts and radio commentators. Keeping 
informed is a habit which should be developed in school. A 
teacher through encouraging leisure-time reading can help de-
velop these habits which will carry over into adult life. 
The teaching of history has a greater significance when the 
end result for the pupil is a healthy attitude toward the demo-
cratic way of life. The record of the struggle to make life more 
livable-or for a better world-is filled with color, drama, and 
pathos. History teachers who understand their business con-
stantly relate whatever history they are teaching to the story 
of their own land, and refuse to allow history teaching to be 
mere presentation of the dry bones of the past. In interpreting 
the character and contributions of some outstanding leaders 
of the past, a teacher will not only familiarize himself with the 
age and times in which these famous leaders lived, but will in-
vestigate all' the sources that help to shed light on their person-
alities and accomplishments. History teachers want it to be 
more than interesting; they wish it to be vital, with direct re-
lationship to the present and to current problems and issues. 
There should be a constant drawing upon current sources in 
illustrating points, and for purposes of comparison. 
S. C. STATE LIBRARY 
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A teacher is not a "preacher", nor is his proper function 
that of a moralizer. In teaching history for democratic attitudes, 
one cannot expect to gain results in a day, a week, or a month. 
The value of the teacher's work will eventually be measured in 
years to come when the pupil takes his place as an adult citizen 
prepared to promote through active participation a more vital 
democracy due to his deep social consciousness. 
It ought to be a school's responsibility to discover the kinds 
of education its pupils most need and to provide appropriate 
education for each of them. There is obviously one chief reason 
for the lack of social competence among young people just out 
of high school. It goes back to the schools' failure to give pu-
pils an opportunity to acquire many of the attitudes and abilities 
which the out-of-school life will demand of them. 
The soundest means of a high school's effectiveness is an 
estimate of how its pupils behave outside of school as citizens, 
workers on jobs, members of families, and dependable, self-re-
specting people. The ability to deal with issues cannot be acquired 
solely from books, or from the history of problems that have 
stirred people in the past, but from direct experience with that 
type of job or problem. 
At the present our high schools are for the most part per-
forming only a limited educational job, and do not need to re-
strict themselves to this limited job which most of them are 
doing. They should be preparing pupils for active and respon-
sible citizenship. "This means much more than seeing that their 
graduates are acquainted with the facts of United States his-
tory and the structure of our national Government. It will mean 
giving our pupils a vivid appreciation of the natural resources, 
the kinds of people, the institutions, the customs and traditions, 
and the ways of living that make up the United States, 
especially the United States of today, in contrast with the other 
major nations of the world. It will mean bringing them face 
to face with important problems for which their towns, their 
state and their nation are seeking a solution .... "z It will en-
courage them to take an active part--even though not eligible 
to vote-in getting things done which are desirable for their 
communities. It is to be hoped that it will discourage that all-
too-rapidly growing attitude that "lets George do it". 
In conclusion, a prospective teacher in addition to being a 
good student with superior scholarship, should know his history, 
should be familiar with his pupils, should know when to teach 
2 Francis T. Spaulding, "What Kind of High School Do You Want," 
Ladies Home Journal, August 1948, p. 169. 
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history, and the purposes for which the content will be 
studied. To those who are helping to prepare teachers of history, 
if research is the interest of the student, perhaps he should be 
encouraged to become a college professor or a research special-
ist, not a high school teacher, whose duties go far beyond re-
search. One should keep in mind that there are those interested 
in the study of history for the purpose of enlightening them-
selves and for the purpose of raising the general intelligence 
of our citizenship. These should be encouraged to develop their 
competency in history. From these may come the teachers. 
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SOUTH CAROLINA COTTON MILLS 
AND THE TILLMAN MOVEMENT 
GUSTAVUS G. WILLIAMSON, JR. 
I 
Cotton mills in South Carolina stood poised for a surge of 
expansion in 1890. Already well established and growing in 
number and in scale of operations, they were setting the pace 
for the whole Southern cotton textile industry. Some discerning 
observers foresaw in this growing industry serious competition 
for the older New England mills in the immediate future.1 
Many solid advantages underlay this development but none 
was more crucial than comparative labor costs. As long as 
Southern mills were free to quarry the large stratum of cheap 
labor available among the region's rural population, they might 
offer increasing inducements to capital, especially outside capi-
tal. These bright prospects determined their resolute resistance 
to any efforts to interfere with their labor program. 
Such efforts did come in South Carolina early in the nineties 
in the shape of agitation against cotton mills and demands 
for labor legislation. Their source was Ben Tillman's farm-
ers' movement, which is revealingly epitomized as lacking 
in consistent reform purposes. Despite some typically Populist 
protests such as its clamoring against corporations, Tillmanism 
was shaped equally by contrary currents of agrarian conserva-
tism and plain political opportunism. These were the forces ex-
ploited skillfully by the mill leaders to turn aside the threat of 
their enterprises and bring the Tillmanites to terms. Signifi-
cantly, their victory perpetuated itself, for farmer politicians 
later repeatedly opposed labor and other social legislation. 
Tillman became governor in 1890 on the crest of a wave of 
unrest swelling up in the past decade among the farmers of South 
Carolina. Falling cotton prices and a general agricultural de-
pression were the immediate causes, yet ultimate responsibility 
lay with an old dilemma, a one-crop economy based on the lien 
system of agriculture credit.2 Tillman knew the farmers' dis-
tress and capitalized on it to form a movement which captured 
1 "Future Location of the Cotton Industries," The Social Economist, 
I (May, 1895), 165. 
2 M. B. Hammond, The Cotton Industry. An Essay in American Eco-
nomic History. Publications of the American Economic Association, I (New 
York, 1897), p. 197. 
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control of the state Democratic party in 1890.3 He created a 
victorious coalition of farmers and politicians, galvanized by his 
supreme talent for arousing a rabid popular following. 
In the process Tillman directed the farmers' anger against 
the Conservative clique controlling the state government. They 
were so entrenched in the public offices, he charged, as to con-
stitute an aristocratic "ring" based on their control of the larger 
cities and the general apathy of the voters. Although there is 
no evidence that Conservatives emulated practitioners of the 
"New Departure," such as Joseph E. Brown in Georgia, in ex-
ploiting political power to advance private business interests, 
they were fully identified with the wealthier classes in the 
towns.4 Consequently they were isolated from the rural ma-
jority of South Carolinians, and became targets, or scapegoats, 
for their resentments.5 
Tillman's sweep of the state met bitter opposition from 
these Conservatives and two years in office served only to in-
tensify the lines of division. In 1892, when he offered for re-
election, his opponents replied with a ticket headed by John C. 
Sheppard, an Edgefield banker and former governor, and James 
L. Orr, a lawyer recently made president of the Piedmont Cotton 
Mill. Despite strenuous efforts to split Tillman's group and de-
tach restless elements, the Conservatives failed to prevent an-
other triumph for him.6 
The men who ran the cotton mills were as a rule inclined to 
the Conservative side by family, social, and business ties. 
Charleston bulked large both in capital invested and in influence; 
and this city was the stronghold of anti-Tillmanism.7 Ellison 
Adger Smyth, president of Pelzer Mill, was originally from 
Charleston. His brother, Augustine T. Smythe, a corporation law-
yer and director of Pelzer Mill, was a Conservative state senator 
from Charleston.8 Francis J. Pelzer, a Charleston cotton factor, 
held large amounts of stock at Newberry and Glendale Mills as 
well as Pelzer Mill.9 Most mill executives were lawyers, bankers, 
3 Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian (Baton 
Rouge, La., 1944), pp. 88-89. 
4 C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, Aurarian Rebel (New York, 1938), 
p. 66. 
5 Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, pp. 79-80. 
6 Ibid., pp. 198-199. Orr was the son of the Reconstruction governor, 
James L. Orr. 
7 Broadus Mitchell, The Rise of the Cotton Mills in the South. Johns 
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 
XXXIX (Baltimore, 1921), p. 236; August Kohn, The Cotton Mills of 
South Carolina. 1907 ( Charleston, S. C., 1907), p. 211. 
8 William P. Jacobs, The Pioneer (Clinton, S. C., n.d.), pp. 21-22. 
9 From the stock books of Glendale, Newl;>,;irry and Pelzer mills. 
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or merchants-all anathema to Tillmanites. 
In addition to their early repugnance for the social aspects 
of the turbulent farmers' movement, which threatened to array 
"class against class," these men were to experience more im-
mediate apprehensions, for in 1892, their mills came under di-
rect attack. Tillman introduced a new element into his cam-
paign performances of the summer when he declared that the 
"issue is ... whether people or corporations shall rule."10 He 
repeatedly flayed Sheppard and Orr as "representatives of cor-
porate. power," controlled by railroads like the Richmond and 
Danville. He boasted of his administration's action in increas-
ing the valuations of corporations for tax assessments.11 
Tillman shifted his line of attack on Orr in a meeting at 
Greenville by charging him with being "president of a factory 
that is making men and women work thirteen hours a day."12 
Orr heatedly denied this, replying that Tillman did not "know 
what he is talking about" and was trying to arouse prejudice 
against factories as he had already against banks and rail-
roads.13 Conservatives were on the defensive and cotton mill 
interests shared their plight during the campaign. A more 
serious threat arose at the fall meeting of the General Assembly 
in Columbia. 
Early in the session a bill was introduced into the House of 
Representatives to regulate the hours of labor in cotton mills. 
This was no surprise. It had been a minor issue in the anti-
mill agitations of 1892, and it had been foreshadowed by un-
successful efforts at labor regulation in 1890. 
These early attempts were the result of coincidental maneu-
vers by politicians to attract labor votes, arising spontaneously 
and unnoticed in several scattered mill counties. Representative 
Stanyarne Wilson, of the largest mill county, Spartanburg, 
emerged as legislative field general in 1890. His political can-
didacy had been first presented to the Spartanburg voters by 
the Democratic Club of Glendale, a mill precinct.14 This alliance 
appeared in the open when, on announcing intention to intro-
duce a labor bill, Wilson presented petitions in its favor from the 
employees of Glendale, Whitney, Trough Shoals, and Clifton 
Factory Number One, all mills in Spartanburg County. Inten-
tions of introducing identical bills were announced by Repre-
10 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, August 10, 1892. 
11 Columbia Daily Register, August 5, 7, 24, 1892. 
12 Columbia State, April 19, 1892. 
13 Greenville News, April 23, 1892; Anderson Peoples AdvQcate, April 
25, 1892. 
14 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, August 61 1890, 
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sentative John Gary Evans of Aiken County, backed by petitions 
from Graniteville, Langley, and Vaucluse mill operatives, and 
by Representative Coleman L. Elease of Newberry, with a pe-
tition from the workers in that county's cotton mill.15 
These men early began to cooperate, for on November 28, 
1890, Wilson's bill was introduced alone. It provided that no 
children under sixteen years of age be employed in cotton or 
woolen mills and that no women be employed in them for 
more than ten hours a day.16 Referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee, it soon was singled out as likely to be accepted.17 
It headed off another ten-hour bill from Representative Fowler 
of Union County, to prevent employment of children under 
ten, which was tabled.18 From committee Wilson's bill emerged 
changed to provide nothing more than a limit of eleven hours 
daily on the labor of women and of children under sixteen in 
the mills.19 In this form it passed the crucial second reading 
in the House by a vote of 81 to 28 and went to the Senate on 
December 17.ro It was killed when the Senate adopted an un-
favorable report from its Judiciary Committee by a vote of 
21 to 10 . .21 
This decisive reversal of the carefully achieved House ver-
dict was unexpected even among supporters of cotton mills. 
Obviously overestimating the prospects of Wilson's bill, the 
mill men had reacted with alarm. Representative Dean of Spar-
tanburg County, who was also sponsored by the Glendale Demo-
cratic Club, was persuaded to present a number of petitions 
from citizens of the town of Spartanburg opposing "the ten 
hour system."22 Following this, a delegation of mill presidents 
descended on Columbia, headed by a group of six-footers ap-
propriately called "the Big Four"-Ellison Smyth of Pelzer, 
Henry P. Hammett of Piedmont, John H. Montgomery of Spar-
tan and Pacolet, and Dexter E. Converse of Clifton and Glen-
dale. 23 They reached the agreement with Wilson and his group 
15 Journal of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of 
the State of South Carolina. Being the Regulat· Session Commencing No-
vember 25, 1890 (Columbia, S. C., 1891), pp. 41-42, 58-59; Charleston News 
and Courier, November 29, 1890. 
16Journal of the House, 1890, pp. 60-61; Charleston News and Courier, 
November 28, 1890; Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, December 5, 1890. 
17 Charleston News and Courier, November 29, 1890. 
18 Journal of the House, 1890, pp. 48, 108, 264-265, 323. 
19 Ibid., p. 191. 
20 Ibid., pp. 323-324, 344. 
21 Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the State of South 
Carolina Being the Regular Session Commencing November 25, 1890 (Co-
lumbia, S. C., 1891), pp. 277, 359, 296, 382-383. 
22 Charleston News and Courier, December 30, 1892. 
23 Jacobs, The Pioneer, p. 30. 
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by which the ban on child labor was dropped and the limitation 
on both child and woman labor was raised to eleven hours.24 
After committee approval of this weakened version, Wilson un-
abashedly shepherded it through the House and then sent it on 
to its death in the Senate. There Senator Augustine T. Srnythe 
revealed exactly how the game had been played when he de-
clared that the present shape of the bill resulted from an ar-
gument by both sides to head off "stringent regulations." De-
spite his antipathy to labor legislation in principle, he would 
respect the agreement. Senator M. L. Donaldson of Greenville 
County revealed clearly the feeling of mill supporters further 
by stating: 
there was now a chance to settle a matter that cropped up an-
nually .... it [was] unjust that the Senate should now try to undo 
an agreement in the absence of those who had come to the agree-
ment. 
Senator J. M. Bell of Aiken County assured the Senate that the 
manufacturing interests of his county were not opposed to the 
bill in that form. Prevailing majority sentiment, however, was 
presented by Senator J. B. Glenn of Anderson, who opposed 
such legislation on a matter which should be left to operatives 
and manufacturers, and by Senator Richard Dozier of George-
town, who opposed it as paternalism in government notwith-
standing "an agreement with a few mills."25 Nevertheless, in 
1892, it was the mills that bore the blame for the failure of the 
Wilson bill to become a law. 
Wilson exploited the issue later in his successful bid for 
nomination as state senator from Spartanburg. In one speech 
he declared :26 
Go to the mines of Siberia and you will find more humanity shown 
to the convicts than in the factories of Spartanburg County. It is 
grinding human flesh into money,26 
More than one hundred workers at Pacolet Mill signed a state-
ment endorsing this. The remainder of the successful slate of 
legislative candidates joined in and pledged to reduce mill hours 
to ten per day.27 The response is best measured in terms of the 
general air of excitement in the county during the elections. 
It reached the frenetic point of widespread expectation of strikes 
in the Spartan Mill and other factories, which their newspaper 
24 Charleston News and Courier, December 4, 6, 1890; Spartanburg 
Carolina Spartan, December 10, 1890. 
25 Charleston News and Courier, December 23, 1890. 
26 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, August 17, 1892. 
27 Charleston News and Courier, September 8, 1892. 
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supporter shrilly attributed to "the scholastic element in the 
county .... [and] artful politicians."28 
No strikes occurred but in the November, 1892, session of the 
General Assembly came fulfillment of the promise of another 
ten-hour labor law proposal. Behind it again stood Wilson and 
John Gary Evans, now members of the Senate, a much more 
pliable body than its predecessor which Tillman had labeled 
"driftwood." Cole L. Elease supported it in the House, and was 
joined by Representative Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville.29 
The bill itself was brought up by Representative Josh Ashley, 
a prosperous but illiterate farmer and lesser Tillmanite from 
Anderson County.30 
Ashley's proposal provided a maximum legal day's work in 
the state's cotton and woolen manufacturing establishments of 
ten hours and a weekly load of sixty hours, with makeup for 
lost time to the extent of one hundred ten hours.31 No mention 
of child or woman labor was included. It reached the Judiciary 
Committee hearings to be met by another delegation of mill 
presidents headed by "the Big Four," the late President Ham-
mett's place being well filled by his successor at Piedmont, 
J. L. Orr, who stood over six feet. A stormy session produced 
agreement on terms increasing the limit of hours to eleven 
per day and sixty-six per week for all mill labor except engi-
neers, mechanics, and clerical force. In this form it passed the 
House by a vote of 86 to 23, and went to the Senate.32 There 
it was guided through successfully by Senator Wilson despite 
real obstacles, such as the loss of the only copy of the bill's 
original draft. Wilson's Judiciary Committee reduced the over-
time allowance to seventy hours a year.33 Otherwise unchanged, 
the Ashley bill passed the Senate.34 
This law has later been judged a compromise on the basis 
28 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, September 7, 1892. 
29 Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, pp. 196, 216. Perry was the son of 
the famous Unionist. 
30 Francis B. Simkins, The Tillman Movement in South Carolina (n.p., 
n.d.), p. 176. 
31 Journal of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly 
of the State of South Carolina Being the Regular Session Commencing 
November 22, 1892 (Columbia, S. C., 1893), p. 58; Charleston News and 
Courier, November 25, 26, 1892. 
32Journal of the House, 1892, pp. 201, 318, 357, 359, 378. 
33 Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the State of South 
Carolina Being the Regular Session Commencing November 22, 1892 (Co-
lumbia, S. C., 1893), pp. 298, 365, 379, 385. 
34 Jbid., pp. 387, 409, 410, 414, 490, 496; Charleston News and Courier, 
December 30, 1892. The full text is in Acts and Resolutions of the General 
Assembly of the State of South Carolina Passed at the Regular Session 
of 1892, part I (Columbia, S. C., 1892), pp. 90-91. 
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of the prevalent estimate of contemporary newspapers.35 In a 
sense, such a characterization is plausible for both sides co-
operated in fashioning the settlement. They did not, however, 
meet halfway; it was a strangely one-sided arrangement for 
a compromise. The final version was exactly what the mill 
men expected and labored to obtain. 
As early as September, they had anticipated another at-
tempt at labor legislation. Warned by the political canvasses 
of Wilson, Elease, Evans, and Perry, they also remembered 
the attempt of 1890. Correspondence began immediately to de-
termine concerted steps of meeting the threat. J. L. Orr wrote 
to R. L. McCaughrin, president of Newberry Mill: 
The Ten hour law will ... be introduced, and in my judgment if 
we go to 11 hours, of our own motion, that will insure the passage 
of the Ten hour law, whereas, if we allow the matter to stand un-
til the legislature meets, by petitions from our people for not less 
than 11 hours, and representations before the Committees, we 
can compromise on eleven hours,36 
A letter from President Ellison Smyth of Pelzer to McCaughrin 
advised: 
if we ourselves reduce time we cannot in good faith reduce wages 
at the same time. We think it best to wait the action of the Legis-
lature. Try to make the best possible terms, and with shorter hours 
come shorter pay.37 
Their chief concern was the possibility of a child labor law, 
as Orr revealed : 
I do not dread the labor law for hours as much as I do for ages. 
A law prohibiting the working of children under 16 yrs. old, would 
increase the cost of production about 25%, and if the age were 
fixed at 14 the cost would be increased at least 10%, We do not 
work them under 12; but from 12 to 16 they make the best spin-
ners and doffers and I don't see how we could get along in the 
Spinning room without that class.38 
His anxiety was founded in facts. Senator Wilson announced 
his intention of again introducing his 1890 bill to ban child 
labor.39 
The mill men's delegation to Columbia met with the sup-
35 Columbia State, December 15, 1892. Compare Elizabeth F. Davidson, 
Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States (Chapel Hill, N. C., 
1939), p. 90; "Report on Condition of Women and Child Wage-Earners 
in the United States," VI, Senate Document, 645, 61 Cong., 2 Session, p. 149. 
36 Orr to McCaughrin, September 29, 1892. (Orr and Smyth letters in 
manuscript used through the courtesy of Professor Lawrence B. Graves 
of Newberry College.) See also copies quoted in extenso in L. B. Graves, 
"The Beginnings of the Cotton Textile Industry in Newberry County," 
(University of South Carolina, M.A. thesis, 1947). 
37 Smyth to McCaughrin, September 28, 1892. 
38 Orr to McCaughrin, September 29, 1892. 
39 Charleston News and Courie1-, November 28, 1892. 
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porters of the labor bills and promised their support of a bill 
raised to eleven hours. Elease disclosed this to everyone's em-
barrassment in the Judiciary Committee hearings while up-
braiding Smyth and Orr for bad faith in that they "agreed not 
to oppose the eleven hour bill." Actually the mill men spoke only 
to make clear for the record their objections to labor legis-
lation in principle and reasons for confining the scope of the 
bill. Ashley announced the change of his bill so early as to be 
almost premature and climaxed the performance by then in-
forming the committee that Senator Wilson had agreed not to 
introduce his child labor bill. On the floor of the House, Elease 
later angrily charged that the weakened bill "was written by 
a man who owns a factory," meaning Orr.40 
The mill men had headed off both child labor restrictions 
and a ten-hour law. Their triumph was due primarily to their 
own political realism. From the first they displayed remarkable 
acumen, not so much in anticipating the obvious threat, but 
in perceiving the chance for an understanding with the poli-
ticians. Eschewing doctrinaire predispositions and repressing 
their political antipathies, they effected a working arrangement 
with the Tillmanites. Their real achievement lay fundamentally 
in evaluating accurately the political forces with which they 
contended. 
II 
The reappearance of agitation for labor legislation in 1892 
resulted from renewed efforts of certain politicians to create 
politically conscious blocs of supporters in the mill villages. 
Although they were all Tillmanites and Evans and Elease were 
leaders of the movement in the Senate and House respectively, 
these men did not have the unswerving support of the whole 
movement. Their legislative proposal never was included in 
its platforms. It is a mistake to assign responsibility for their 
interest in mill labor to Tillmanism in general, for there was 
little room for industrial workers in a movement of and for 
land-holding farmers.41 
In 1892, however, the farmers were unusually responsive 
to fulminations against cotton mills. Smyth and Orr considered 
them in large measure the source and the object of the attacks. 
Their letters to McCaughrin stated: 
40 Ibid., December 6, 15, 1892; Columbia State, December 6, 15, 1892; 
Columbia Daily Register, December 6, 15, 1892. 
41 William W. Ball, The State that Forgot, South Carolina's Surrender 
to Democracy (Indianapolis, Ind., n.d.), pp. 206-7, 209-10, 217, 223. Wallace, 
History of South Carolina (New York, 1934), III, 365-6. 
-
44 THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL AsSOCIATION 
back of this there is a wide spread feeling among the farmers 
that the factories are making a great deal of money and are taking 
and will continue to take their best tenants, by giving larger 
wages, than they can pay. 
The farmers feel the Mills have taken their best tenants. The 
'movement' now is to reduce wages to a parity with that of farm 
help. The agitation has not come from the mill people but from the 
'movement.'42 
One large-scale landholder stated in the press: "I oppose cot-
ton factories because the farmers cannot compete with them 
in the price paid for labor."43 
Competition for labor, then, accentuated a latent factor in 
rural areas-a "certain prejudice ... against the mills and the 
operators." Now the flame was fanned by the men whom one 
newspaper denounced as "artful demagogues saying that the 
manufacturing companies are evil ... and that they pay far 
too little for cotton when the price of cotton cloth is con-
sidered."44 
This attack probed close to the farmers' tenderest spot, par-
ticularly when falling cotton prices, ranging from 8 to 6.5 cents 
in the Piedmont, were compared with mill stock currently sel-
ling at premiums on the Charleston market.45 Resentment still 
smoldered over the mills' action in suspending cotton buying 
during the debates on labor laws in 1890, and they threatened 
to renew this pressure in 1892.46 Another form of pressure was 
even more serious-proposals in the General Assembly to ex-
tend the ten-hour day to farm laborers.47 Though rejetted, 
these served to emphasize the mixed reaction among Tillmanites. 
Many considered labor legislation paternalistic interference and 
were reluctant to accept it, whatever their grievances against 
mills.48 
Nowhere else do the fundamental contradictions inherent in 
Tillmanism stand out more vividly. Tillman's raison d'etre po-
litically had become in a large measure championing the people 
against corporations. But his movement was as short on sus-
tained performance as it was long on promise. Expressing form-
less rural antagonisms, it did not develop a comprehensive re-
42 Orr to McCaughrin, September 29, 1892; Smyth to McCaughrin, 
September 28, 1892. 
43 Charleston News and Courier, August 27, 1892. 
44 Ibid., September 10, 1892; Greenville News, April 14, 1902. 
45 Charleston News and Courier, September 1, 4, 8, 10, 12, 1892; Green-
ville Mountaineer, January 4, 1893. 
46 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, December 5, 10, 1892; Charleston 
News and Courier, December 3, 29, 1892. 
47 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, December 7, 1892. 
48 Charleston News and Courier, December 15, 1892. 
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form program for the dilemma of the agricultural state. Nor 
did it come close to being a genuine Populist or farmer-labor 
party. An instinctive conservatism remained beneath its sur-
face of high excitement and sporadic cannonading to the left.49 
There were charges in 1892 that Ben Tillman was spon-
soring a "leveling agrarianism . . . a coalition of the landless 
and homeless and moneyless."5o But in retrospect he called his 
party "an agricultural movement ... not an agrarian movement 
in any sense of the word."51 He certainly blunted the force of 
the Farmers Alliance in South Carolina by absorbing it after 
a long, uneasy courtship.52 
He was opposed in 1890 by an evanescent organization of 
"tenants and wage-earners" as the very symbol of a "landed 
aristocracy."53 The railroad workers organized an Industrial 
Union in Columbia in 1892 with some tenant farmers against 
Ben Tillman and his "pack of ignorant farmers."54 The feel-
ing was mutual, for he told a delegation of railroad men that 
their "opposition does not amount to a damn compared with 
50,000 or 60,000 farmers . . . ."55 And, when faced with his 
widely quoted characterization of Graniteville mill workers as 
"that damned factory element," he failed to deny it convinc-
ingly, an indication of his lack of esteem.66 
In his inaugural speech in 1890, Tillman declared: 
Corporations are not public enemies, although they are, if unbri-
dled, apt to be oppressive ... Therefore, we should carefully watch 
to see that nothing is done to injure our railroad or manufacturing 
companies •. ,57 
And soon after his re-election he wrote, "Vested rights and 
investments of all kinds are as safe in South Carolina as they 
are anywhere."08 
Tillman's only overt attack on cotton mills as such in 1892 
was based on their alleged injustice to farmers in paying only 
thirty-five dollars for a bale of cotton, the manufactured pro-
49 Ball, op. cit., pp. 206-7, 209-10, 217, 223; Simkins, Pitchfork Ben 
Tillman, p. 189. 
60 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, August 17, 1892. 
61 Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., XXXI, 3310. 
52 Ball op. cit., pp. 223-224; Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, pp. 205-206. 
63 Charleston News and Courier, July 4, 1890. 
64 Columbia, Daily Register, December 23, 28, 31, 1892; Spartanburg 
Carolina Spartan, January 4, 1893. 
65 Ball, op. cit., p. 175. 
56 Columbia State, August 16, 19, 31, 1892, Columbia Daily Register, De-
cember 16, 1892; Charleston News and Courier, October 3, 1892. 
67 Journal of the House 1890, p. 146. 
68 Tillman to Vander Lyles, May 16, 1893. (From Dr. F. B. Simkins' 
transcript of manuscript in Tillman Letter l!Qok1 189~-18~3.) 
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duct of which brought in seventy dollars.59 In blandly seeking 
out damaging evidence of conditions in J. L. Orr's factory, he 
plainly was "politicking."60 Otherwise he showed constant toler-
ance for cotton mills ; he was a personal friend of the mill pro-
moter, Daniel A. Tompkins, from whose company in Charlotte, 
North Carolina, he borrowed money in 1892.61 In the United 
States Senate he later gloated over South Carolina's textile 
growth, saying, "We built the mills . . . and we can beat all 
creation making the coarser fabrics."62 
The ranks of Tillman's movement contained many lawyers 
and professional politicians. No ideological inhibitions prevented 
these men from profiting from cotton mills. W. Christie Benet, 
Abbeville Tillman leader, subscribed substantially to the stock 
issue at the Newberry Mill in 1895.63 D. K. Norris, an early as-
sociate, organized the Norris Cotton Mills with D. A. Tomp-
kins.64 Ira B. Jones, House Speaker, was an original director and 
stockholder in the Lancaster Mills in 1895. 66 Even Stanyarne Wil-
son admitted in 1890 that he was no enemy of factories per se 
but owned stock in several.66 His moderation was expressed in 
the 1892 legislative debate by a supporter, Representative Fos-
ter of Spartanburg, "The factory labor bill ... will give satis-
faction to all parties concerned."67 Such remarks demon-
strated the anti-mill group's general willingness to find some 
arrangement acceptable to mill men that would pass as a vin-
dication of campaign promises. Such opportunism produced 
neither labor politicians nor social legislation. 
Despite these real limitations, however, the anti-mill "cru-
sade" was no idle threat in 1892. At the same time that the 
mill men moved toward a modus operandi with the politicians 
they mustered their strength against internal disruption of their 
mills. 
Frequent charges of political pressure of mills on workers 
punctuated the campaign. Wilson declared, "Men are deprived 
of the right to vote by these corporations."68 J. L. Orr was 
69 Columbia State, May 4, 1892. 
60 Tillman to H. B. Buist, April 4, 1892. (Simkins transcript) 
61 D. H. Tompkins to D. A. Tompkins, January 1, 1892. (Simkins tran-
script). D. H. Tompkins was Tillman's private secretary. 
62 Congressional Record, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., XXXIII, 3213. 
63 From Newberry Mill stock list. 
64 George T. Winston, A Builder of the New South, Being the Story 
of the Life Work of Daniel Augustus Tompkins (Garden City, N. Y., 1920), 
p. 189. 
66 From Lancaster Mill stock list quoted in Elliott W. Springs, Clothes 
Make the Man, (privately printed), pp. 10-11. 
66 Charleston News and Courier, December 17, 1890. 
67 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, December 21, 1892. 
68 Ibid., August 17, 1892. 
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forced to devote a good part of his oratory to denying political 
intimidations at Piedmont.69 Even Tillman added fuel to the 
flame by reading an affidavit from one W. L. Snipes claiming 
to have been discharged from Pelzer Mill for attending a Till-
man meeting. 70 
The charge was met promptly by a telegram from Presi-
dent Smyth of Pelzer to Tillman: "The statement of Snipes is 
false ... He voluntarily left the employ of the company." A 
simultaneous statement to the press, however, mentioned dis-
charging other employees but for non-political reasons.71 This 
acknowledgment, echoed in similar statements from President 
Montgomery of Pacolet Mill, confirms the fact that men were 
being fired rather often with political implications attending.72 
The very fervor of these denials bespoke a sensitive attitude 
just as did the apology of a pro-mill newspaper: "the employer 
has a perfect right not to employ hands that ... may oppose 
any enterprise he may be running."73 
Whether they amounted to pressure or not, the really strong 
bids for political support by outstanding mill leaders were fre-
quently successful. To an accompaniment of mass meetings, 
Conservative clubs, and such, the Sheppard-Orr ticket carried 
the following mill precincts: Anderson, Pelzer, Pendleton, Pied-
mont, and Newberry, and in Spartanburg County, Beaumont, 
Cowpens, Clifton, Enoree, Pacolet, Gaffney City, and Trough 
Shoals. The margin was only four votes at Pelzer; and the 
Tillmanite legislative nominees carried Clifton in spite of Till-
man's loss, a split which was repeated at Pelham. The Tillman 
ticket carried the Horse Creek Valley mills, in Aiken County, 
such as Graniteville and Vaucluse, and Glendale, Fingerville, 
Spartan Mills, and Whitney in Spartanburg.74 
Management attempted to offset any losses of political al-
legiance by stressing the value of loyalty between employee and 
employer. The Pelzer operatives held a mass meeting to protest 
the campaign charge that they were "tyrannically treated" and 
to express their affection for President Smyth; full newspaper 
coverage was obtained.75 The fierce, individualistic pride of mill 
workers, so similar to that of farmers, was capitalized. A large 
69 Greenville News, August 15, 1892; Columbia Daily Register, August 
14, 1892; Columbia State, July 30, 1892. 
70 Columbia Daily Register, August 14, 19, 1892. 
71 Columbia State, August 16, 1892. 
72 Ibid., August 12, 1892. 
73 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, August 31, 1892. 
74 Ibid., September 7, 1892; Columbia State, August 31, 1892; Charles-
ton News and Courier, September 1, 1892. 
75 Anderson Peoples Advocate, October 3, 1892. 
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group of Spartan Mill employees, for example, rebuked a Spar-
tanburg politician for "reflecting upon our character as parents 
and citizens ... and saying that we or our children are in-
humanly treated by the managers."76 Orr's statement to his 
workers that "our interests are identical" had its effect in the 
prevailing atmosphere of easy first-name cordiality.77 
Arguments of their self-interest also were paraded before 
the mill workers. An Enoree Mill employee warned his fellows 
that labor legislation was "a trap" to "reduce wages through-
out the state" in mills.78 As newspaper apologists expressed it, 
"It is a plain problem in arithmetic ... Let the workers say 
whether they want the short hours and short pay or not."79 They 
were reminded that they had "better schools and church facili-
ties, more comforts, better food and clothing and much better 
society than they had on the farms."80 
Although the agitations of 1892 increased the permanent 
political consciousness of mill labor somewhat, they did not 
succeed in turning them against the leadership of their mills for 
long. Actually the effect was ultimately in the opposite direction 
since the anti-mill campaign hit labor as well as management. 
Inadvertently it increased the stigma of these workers and iso-
lated them a bit further from the rest of the population, thus 
helping to make them more nearly a disciplined industrial prole-
tariat in the factories and villages. At the same time an im-
petus was given to individualism that worked against class ac-
tion or organization against employers or even further attempts 
at labor legislation. 
Although the law of 1892 nullified contracts for excessive 
hours and provided fines of fifty to one hundred dollars for vio-
lators convicted in court, it had no real teeth. Court action was 
beyond the unaided means of mill workers. Lacking machinery 
for enforcement and supervision by the state, this sham openly 
invited evasion. As late as 1911, the state agency charged with 
enforcing the current mill hours law, unchanged in basic legal 
structure since 1892, described it as "so constructed as to make 
it absolutely impossible to ascertain whether there had been a 
violation of the intent and purposes of the law."81 
76 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, August 17, 1892. 
77 Greenville News, April 14, 1902. 
78 Charleston, News and Courier, August 27, 1892. 
79 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, August 31, 1892. 
80 Charleston News and Courier, September 8, 1892. 
81 Third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce, 
and Industries, Labor Division, 1911- (Columbia, S. C., 1912), p. 4. 
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In early 1893 a Spartanburg newspaper observed: 
The cotton mills are doing fairly well . . . There may be a little 
friction caused by the new factory law, but there will not be much 
trouble.82 
The mill processes continued smoothly as several changes were 
assimilated; piece rates were introduced more widely, and free 
rent on mill-owned houses was ended.83 One condition remained 
unchanged, however, child labor, which was 26.7 per cent of 
the total work force in the mills of South Carolina in 1890, was 
26.9 per cent in 1900.84 
The earlier trickle of outside capital began to widen into a 
flood. Throughout the state's textile industry opportunities for 
profit attracted more and more investments from local sources 
as well as the financial centers of the country. A note of warn-
ing to the legislature was sounded by the Charleston News and 
Courier in 1892: "If we begin now a policy of oppression, or 
even of undue interference with this industry, we shall drive it 
from the state ... "85 In 1895 an answer was presented by Mr. 
Jefferson Coolidge, a New England cotton manufacturer, testi-
fying to a Massachusetts legislative committee concerning the 
rising threat of mills in the South. Their most important advan-
tage lay in the constantly low labor costs; much of this he at-
tributed to the fact that "Now they have no legislative diffi-
culties .... " 86 It was a remarkably accurate analysis, for the 
mills of South Carolina faced no labor legislation again until 
1903.87 
82 Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, January 11, 1893. 
83 Graves, "Beginnings of the Cotton Textile Industry in Newberry 
County," p. 60; Daniel A. Tompkins, Cotton Mill Commercial Features 
(Charlotte, N. C., 1899), p. 118. 
84 "Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners," p. 46. 
85 September 10, 1892. 
86 Quoted in Edward Porritt, "The Cotton Mills in the South," New 
England Magazine XII (May, 1895), p. 577. 
ffl "Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners," pp. 
149-150. 
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THE PROBLEM OF NEGRO EDUCATION 
IN THE SOUTH 
E. BASKIN WRIGHT 
In the complex bi-racial society of the Southern States, noth-
ing has been more fundamental than the proposition that the 
white and colored races should be segregated in educational 
institutions. This principle of segregation has been maintained 
from the lowest grades of the public schools through the most 
advanced graduate courses in the colleges. It is a principle 
which is contained in both the constitutions and the laws of 
the Southern States and is applicable to privately endowed 
schools or colleges as well as institutions supported by the state. 
Typical of such legal requirements is the provision in the 
South Carolina Constitution of 1895 which states in Article 
eleven, Section seven: "Separate schools shall be provided for 
children of the white and colored races, and no child of either 
race shall be permitted to attend a school provided for the 
other race." Furthermore, Section 5377 of the Code of South 
Carolina provides: "It shall be unlawful for pupils of one race 
to attend the schools provided by boards of trustees for per-
sons of another race." Such legal requirements are found in the 
constitutions and laws of all Southern States and several states 
bordering the South. 
These legal bans on a mingling of the races in educational 
institutions have been repeatedly upheld by federal courts at 
all levels, including the Supreme Court of the United States 
with the proviso, however, that "substantially equal" educa-
tional facilities must be furnished to both races. The Supreme 
Court has been extremely liberal in interpreting the phrase 
"substantially equal" and has repeatedly winked at flagrant 
violations of the spirit of the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
This tendency on the part of the Federal Supreme Court 
to construe liberally the educational facilities offered to the 
two races and the apparent willingness of the Court to accept 
any type of education afforded by the Southern States so long 
as schools are actually open to both races, led to a feeling of 
security that the South would be left to develop its educational 
institutions in almost any manner it chose 
Any complacency which the South may have developed 
through the years on this score was rudely shattered, however, 
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in 1938, when the United States Supreme Court made an ad-
verse ruling on the principle of segregation in institutions of 
higher learning. This ruling was handed down in the now 
famous case of Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada. Lloyd Gaines, 
a Negro, applied for admission to the Law School of the Uni-
versity of Missouri. He held a Bachelor of Arts degree from 
Lincoln University, a school for negroes maintained by the State 
of Missouri, and was fully qualified to enter the law school in 
so far as his academic training was concerned. However, he 
was denied admission to the University Law School solely upon 
the grounds that he was a negro. Under Missouri law segre-
gation was maintained at all educational levels and the law 
provided for paying the out-of-state tuition of any Missouri 
negro to attend the schools of some other state where the course 
of study which he desired to pursue was not available to negroes 
in a state supported school in Missouri. Gaines refused to accept 
such an off er and brought suit in the federal district court. The 
case finally reached the United States Supreme Court and Chief 
Justice Hughes handed down the opinion of the Court in which 
he ruled that the negro was entitled to be admitted to the 
white law school in the absence of a state supported negro 
school providing similar educational opportunities. 
In his opinion the Chief Justice stated: "The equal protec-
tion of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. 
Manifestly, the obligations of the state to give the protection 
of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, 
that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality 
of legal rights must be maintained and the state was bound 
to furnish WITHIN ITS BORDERS facHities for legal edu-
cation substantially equal to those which the state there afforded 
for persons of the white race .... " 
While the Southern States were disquieted and disturbed by 
the decision in the Gaines case, the full implications of the case 
did not become apparent until eight or nine years later. Begin-
ning in 1946 and continuing in 1947, 1948, and 1949, negroes 
began to apply for admission to the state supported white law 
schools in South Carolina, Oklahoma, Arkansas and other 
southern states and for courses in medicine, engineering and 
other studies which were not available in the state supported 
negro schools. This was no isolated Gaines case but a carefully 
planned program to break down the principle of segregation 
in the Southern States at the graduate school and professional 
school level. The chief instigator of the plan was the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and this 
--
52 THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
organization placed competent legal talent at the disposal of 
qualified negro students who were willing to offer themselves 
as guinea pigs in the interest of gaining equality for their race. 
Thus, like a delayed action bomb, the full meaning of the 
Gaines case burst upon the consciousness of the Southern States 
and shattered what complacency may have remained after the 
Missouri decision. In South Carolina, John H. Wrighten, a 
negro, applied for admission to the University of South Carolina 
Law School on July 2, 1946. His application was referred to 
President Norman M. Smith of the University who rejected 
the application four days later and a subsequent application 
to the Board of Trustees was also rejected. The only reason 
given for rejecting the applications was that Wrighten was a 
negro and the Constitution and laws of South Carolina forbid 
both races to attend the same educational institution. A case 
arising out of a denial of admission to Wrighten reached 
a hearing in the Federal District Court presided over by Judge 
J. Waites Waring in the summer of 1947 and Judge Waring 
followed the dictum of Chief Justice Hughes in the Gaines case 
and ruled in favor of Wrighten. Judge Waring, in deciding 
in favor of the negro said: "The plaintiff, Wrighten, is entitled 
to the same opportunity and facilities afforded to whites for 
obtaining a legal education by and in the State of South 
Carolina." 
Faced with the alternative of establishing a law school for 
negroes, abolishing the law school for whites, or admitting the 
negro to the University Law School, the state opened a law 
school for negroes at Orangeburg which enrolled eight negroes 
in its freshman class in September, 1947, and has a current 
enrollment of twelve. Significantly absent from the first negro 
law class in the history of the State of South Carolina was 
John H. Wrighten. 
A similar action to the Wrighten case involved Ada Lois 
Sipuel, a negro woman, who was denied admission to the Law 
School of the University of Oklahoma. The County Court and 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma had upheld the action of the Uni-
versity Board of Regents under Oklahoma's segregation law 
but the United States Supreme Court in a short and curt per 
curiam opinion reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma and went a step farther than either the Gaines or 
Wrighten cases by ruling that the state had to furnish not only 
the negro a legal education but had to furnish it as quickly as 
it would furnish such an education to a white student. Oklahoma 
hurriedly opened a negro law school to which Ada Lois Sipuel 
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made no application for admission but instead petitioned the 
United States Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to com-
pel compliance with the Court's decision. The Court, however, 
dismissed the petition on the ground that the original writ of 
certiorari did not present the question of whether the state 
could satisfy the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by establishing a separate school for negroes, so 
on this question the Supreme Court has made no ruling. 
The State of Arkansas met a similar situation by admitting a 
negro law student to the white University Law School and 
teaching him on a segregation basis in different classrooms. 
This plan was too much of a drain on the time of the teaching 
staff of the law school so the negro was then permitted to 
enter the classrooms occupied by white students, but with a 
wooden railing placed around his desk to simulate segregation. 
Student ridicule forced the University authorities to remove 
the railing and the student now attends classes on a complete 
basis of equality with white students. In September, 1948, the 
University of Arkansas also admitted a negro woman, on an 
unsegregated basis, to the University Medical School. 
The repercussions of these various cases and the fear of 
others of a similar nature prompted the governors of the South-
ern States and some of the border states to face the problem 
and at a meeting of such governors in Tallahassee, Florida, 
in the spring of 1948, a plan for regional graduate and profes-
sional study was considered and approved by the governors of 
fourteen states. Under this plan, the Southern States and such 
border states as cared to participate would offer graduate and 
professional courses of study to dtizens of both races on a re-
gional basis utilizing the schools of the region but maintaining 
the principle of segregation. 
The plan was presented to Congress for its approval since 
Article I, Section 10, Paragraph 3 of the Federal Constitution 
provides that: "No state shall, without consent of Congress, .. . 
enter into any agreement or compact with another state .... " 
In the United States Senate the plan met with the bitter opposi-
tion of negro leaders in committee hearings and never reached 
the floor for debate. Whether it will ever be approved by Con-
gress or whether any further effort to secure congressional ap-
proval will be made is problematical since the leaders of the 
movement decided to go forward with the plan without such 
approval. 
A permanent Regional Council for Education has been set 
up with a small staff in Atlanta and otne:r meetings have 
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been held to plan the development of this regional program. 
A meeting was held at Savannah in December, 1948, and at 
this meeting it was agreed to go forward with the program in 
two fields, veterinary medicine and medicine. Under the re-
gional plan for the study of veterinary medicine three white 
schools, the University of Georgia, Alabama Polytechnic In-
stitute, and Oklahoma A. and M. College and one negro school, 
Tuskegee Institute, were designated as regional centers. The 
University of Georgia will provide training in veterinary medi-
cine for the states of Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, West 
Virgina, and Virginia. Oklahoma A. and M. will serve Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, while Alabama Polytechnic 
Institute, or Auburn, as it is more commonly known, will pro-
vide this training for students from Alabama, Florida, Miss-
issippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee. All negro students in 
veterinary medicine will be trained at Tuskegee. 
Under the plan, each state is alloted a quota. South Carolina's 
quota for white students at Auburn is 12 for each of the four 
classes. Its quota for negro students at Tuskegee is four for 
each class. This will mean a quota of twelve students at Auburn 
next year, twenty-four the second year, thirty-six the third 
year and forty-eight the fourth year and thereafter. For ne-
groes, the quota at Tuskegee starts at four for next year and 
goes up to sixteen for the four year course. Each state will pay 
the regional center $1,000 per year for each student from that 
state but if it fails to meet the quota, it must still pay for the 
equivalent of its quota whether any students from that state 
attend the regional center or not. On this basis South Carolina 
will be required to pay to Auburn a minimum of $9,000 next 
year up to a maximum of $12,000 if the South Carolina quota 
is completely filled. These figures would rise to a minimum of 
$36,000 and a maximum of $48,000 on the fourth and each suc-
ceeding year. Payments at Tuskegee next year would begin at a 
minimum of $3,000 with a maximum of $4,000 and in four 
years these figures would rise to a $12,000 minimum and 
$16,000 maximum. 
In medicine, all the white medical colleges, either state sup- . 
ported or privately endowed within the region which are ac-
credited by the American Medical Association, are designated 
as regional schools for white students, but only Meharry Medical 
College at Nashville is designated as a regional school for ne-
gro medical students. In fact, the plans call for the Regional 
Council to assume full responsibility for the operation of Me-
harry College, which is now faced with bankruptcy. The two 
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programs mentioned above which are supposed to begin opera-
tion next September will cost the state of South Carolina 
$120,000 during the next fiscal year. Governor J. Strom Thur-
mond has requested the General Assembly to make an appro-
priation of that amount to insure South Carolina's participation 
in the plan. 
It is true that the plan for regional education in the South 
is not entirely a plan to perpetuate segregation at the graduate 
and professional levels. Such a plan has been under discussion 
in the South for some fifteen years since it is recognized that 
for every Southern State to furnish a full program of graduate 
and professional studies would be a severe drain on the resources 
of these states. However, the negro problem brought the mat-
ter to a head, and certainly the continuation of segregation at 
the college levels is the important purpose of the plan. 
Fundamentally the plan is sound in so far as it pools the 
resources of the Southern States to improve the caliber of 
higher education in the South. It should be obvious that it will 
be more economical to get the backing of all the Southern States 
for schools which have already developed and to improve these 
schools and make them outstanding institutions than it would 
be for each Southern State to attempt to duplicate all these 
services at state expense and possibly to doubly duplicate them, 
if that term may be used, in order to preserve the principle of 
segregation. However, there are many obstacles to overcome 
if the plan is to succeed, obstacles of both a legal and a policy 
nature. 
Let us first look at the legal obstacles of the plan. The Con-
stitution provides that no state can enter into an agreement or 
compact with another state without the consent of Congress. 
Such consent has not been secured and may never be secured. 
In the light of the civil rights fight, this is hardly a propitious 
time to ask Congress to approve an interstate agreement which 
definitely has as one of its purposes the perpetuation of segre-
gation in Southern Colleges. However, the lack of Congressional 
approval may not of itself be a fatal defect of the plan. The 
interstate compact clause of the Constitution has in the past 
been more honored by the breach than the observance. Very 
few formalized interstate agreements have ever been submit-
ted to Congress for approval, and it is quite probable that for 
every such agreement which has the approval of Congress, 
there are a hundred agreements which have never even been 
submitted to Congress for approval. For example, the .State of 
West Virginia which has only a two year medical college, has 
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a written agreement with the State of Virginia by terms of 
which the State of Virginia binds herself to furnish the last 
two years of medical training to the West Virginia students 
who have successfully completed the two year medical course 
offered by West Virginia University. Although this agreement 
has been in effect for several years without congressional ap-
proval, it has never been challenged in any court. Other ex-
amples of such an interstate agreement are between two state 
governors over the location of a bridge over an interstate stream 
and over the policing of a stream which serves as the boundary 
between two states. Since it is common practice among states 
to make these agreements without the consent of Congress, it 
may well be that the United States Supreme Court will not 
consider the lack of congressional approval as a fatal defect 
of the regional education plan when the plan comes before 
that court for review as it most certainly will. 
Another possible legal objection to the plan is the question 
of whether a state under its own constitution and laws can le-
gally spend money to help support an institution of learning 
located in another state. This is probably a minor legal point 
and might be corrected by changes in the constitutions or 
codes of the participating states. 
The most serious legal hurdle that the regional plan will 
have to clear is the matter of furnishing education to a negro 
outside the boundary of the state, even in a school which is 
partially supported by the state. The dictum of the Wrighten 
and Gaines cases definitely requires that the negro be entitled 
to education WITHIN THE BORDERS of the state if such edu-
cation is furnished to whites. Obviously a South Carolina negro 
would have no legal grounds for complaint if he is required 
to go to Alabama for an education in veterinary medicine pro-
vided a white South Carolina veterinary medicine student must 
also leave the state for his education; but what about the 
Georgia negro who is required to go to Tuskegee Institute in 
Alabama while his white compatriot is furnished the same edu-
cation within the borders of Georgia? A South Carolina negro 
might have a legal basis for complaint if he is required to take 
his medical course at Meharry College in Tennessee while a 
white South Carolina medical student can be educated at Charles-
ton. It would require a complete reversal of at least this part 
of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Gaines case to up-
hold the constitutionality of the regional system and such re-
versal is highly unlikely. This stumbling block of constitution-
i 
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ality of the regional plan may well be the immovable object 
on which the plan will be demolished. 
There are other difficulties about the plan which are of a 
policy nature, rather than a legal nature. To what extent will 
the legislature of one state be willing to lend partial support 
to an educational institution in another state? To what extent 
will the states in which the regional institutions are located 
be willing to make capital outlays to enlarge their facilities to 
accommodate students from other states? These are two impor-
tant questions of policy. If South Carolina should agree to ad-
mit to the Medical College of South Carolina twenty students 
each year from Florida, which has no medical school, this could 
be done by refusing admission to an equal number of South 
Carolina applicants. We are unable to accept now, because of 
limited facilities, all the qualified South Carolina students who 
would like to study medicine. Will we reject even more of our 
own citizens to make way for Florida students? Obviously we 
will not. The alternative is to invest a considerable sum of 
money as a capital outlay to enlarge our present facilities in 
order to accommodate Florida students. It is unthinkable that the 
General Assembly of South Carolina would authorize such an 
expenditure and equally unthinkable that the Legislature of 
Florida would appropriate money to build buildings and provide 
laboratory facilities in South Carolina. These obstacles of policy 
may be just as fatal to the plan as the legal obstades. The 
theory is fine but the plan has been formulated on too short 
notice and has not been properly thought through. Its success 
is extremely doubtful and if the regional plan fails because of 
obstacles of policy or is declared unconstitutional by the courts, 
what then? 
The Southern States will be faced with either adopting the 
Arkansas plan of admitting negroes on an unsegregated basis 
to the state supported white schools where the courses they 
desire are not available in state supported negro schools or 
they may adopt the South Carolina plan of adding new courses 
to the state supported negro schools as the demand arises. Such 
a plan is very expensive, though probably not prohibitively 
so, especially if the Southern States will take stock of their 
white schools and eliminate, as some Southern States have 
already done, the wasteful duplication of services furnished by 
the white state schools. On this score South Carolina has done 
virtually nothing, but much could be done and may have to be 
done if the regional plan runs foul of the courts and the 
problem of educating our negroes is thrown back in our laps. 
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Since South Carolina has already embarked upon a pro-
gram of providing additional courses of study for negroes on 
a segregated basis at the State College when demand for such 
courses is made, we must consider what it would cost the state 
to equalize college facilities and training if the regional plan 
is declared unconstitutional or collapses of its own weight. The 
present valuation of the real estate and equipment of the five 
white state supported colleges in South Carolina is $26,685,176, 
according to state estimates. The value of the real estate and 
equipment of the negro school at Orangeburg is $1,850,000. 
These figures do not take into account unexpended appropria-
tions for capital improvements, which, if added, would weigh 
the balance more heavily in favor of the white schools. No one 
would suggest that the state would be required to expend al-
most $25,000,000 to equalize college facilities but possibly the 
figure would more nearly approach four or five million dollars 
in say a ten year period, if all fields of study now available to 
white college students in South Carolina are provided for ne-
groes. The five million figure should even cover a negro medi-
cal college. Of course, considerably enlarged annual appropria-
tions for operation would be necessary, but it is not an impos-
sible undertaking and would undoubtedly be more satisfactory 
to the people of this state than would the breaking down of the 
system of segregation. Segregation is a luxury which the state 
must be prepared to pay for if it is to be maintained. 
The spectacular Gaines and Wrighten cases have centered 
attention on the problem of negro education at the college level, 
but recent developments, not so well publicized, but even more 
dangerous, are now evident in a frontal attack on the public 
schools by the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People. 
On July 29, 1948, a federal district judge in Virginia de-
parted entirely from the time honored criterion of "substantial 
equality" in education and ordered the school authorities of 
King George County in Virginia to provide facilities for study 
for negroes which were actually equal to such facilities sup-
plied to the whites. This case, instigated and handled in court 
by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, led to an order by Federal Judge Hutcheson permanently 
enjoining the school authorities of King George County from 
further racial discrimination and ordering them to furnish 
the negroes of that county school facilities actually equal to 
those of the whites. Under threat of contempt proceedings 
against the school authorities, the people of the county voted a 
. ,, 
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bond issue of $150,000 for equalizing these facilities. The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
followed up the victory in King George County by starting simi-
lar suits in other Virginia counties and, as a result of one of 
these cases, three members of the Board of Education and the 
county superintendent of Glouchester County were fined $250 
apiece for contempt of court. Already the National Association 
for Advancement of Colored People in South Carolina has 
served notice that a series of similar suits will be brought 
shortly in South Carolina. 
In the light of these developments, let us analyze the situa-
tion as it now exists in the public schools of South Carolina. 
The physical properties now used for white public schools in 
this state are valued at over 55 million dollars; those used for 
negro public school education at slightly in excess of nine mil-
lion. An official of the State Department of Education has esti-
mated that it would require an expenditure of 50 million dollars 
to equalize the physical facilities for the two races and this is 
not taking into account other-factors. In 1947, 1,750 buses and 
91 automobiles transported 87,220 white pupils to school while 
65 buses and twelve automobiles transported 3,769 negro pu-
pils. The average annual salary paid negro public school teach-
ers was $1,025 while white teachers averaged better than $1,600. 
In 1947-48 the state spent almost $34,500,000 on public school 
education, approximately seventy-five percent of which went 
for white education. With 39% of the total number of public 
school pupils, negro education at that level received approxi-
mately 25% of state funds. In 1946-47 the number of negro 
pupils enrolled in the elementary schools actually exceeded the 
total of such white pupils. The great discrepancy in numbers 
is at the high school level where only 37% as many negroes are 
enrolled as white students. This is no doubt partially due to the 
woeful lack of adequate high school facilities for negroes par-
ticularly in the smaller counties. It is unnecessary to cite fur-
ther statistics to prove what we already know, namely, that 
there is nothing remotely approaching equality of educational 
opportunities for the two races in the public schools of South 
Carolina. 
Faced with these hard and unpleasant facts, what are we 
going to do about it? Shall we wait until we are forced, county 
by county, to equalize our schools with contempt proceedings 
forcing drastic and ill considered legislation or shall we face 
the issue squarely and work out a practical long range program 
that can be accomplished? The latter approach would appear 
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to be far more logical. A huge bond issue designed to accomplish 
immediate equalization would leave unsolved the problem of in-
creased cost of operation and would also leave untouched the 
pressing problem of improving our white schools which today are 
far below average nationally. 
The answer would seem to be a drastically increased annual 
budget for the public school system. Federal aid, if and when it 
comes, will be of great assistance but at the present time the 
State of South Carolina is carrying 94% of the load with only 
six percent coming from the Federal Government. Even with 
increased federal aid, the State will have to continue to bear 
the greater part of the expense of the public schools, and any 
real improvement in the schools, both white and colored, must 
come by state action rather than by action of the 1,680 school 
districts of the state. 
Where improvement is most needed, the local units are least 
able to increase their budgets and the heavy concentration 
of negroes is in the poorer counties. Increased local assessments 
will not suffice. The state must assume far more of the expense 
of operation than it now assumes and if that is to be the case, 
where is the money coming from? That is, of course, a policy 
problem which can only be decided by the General Assembly. 
However, it may not be out of the way to express one man's 
opinion. 
The additional revenue required might be secured by rais-
ing the state income tax, but such a move would not be wise 
because already the South Carolina income tax is reasonably 
high, compared to other states. Increased taxes on gasoline, in-
toxicants, cigarettes and soft drinks would be undesirable and in 
some cases might reach the point of diminishing returns. The 
only large source of untouched revenue for South Carolina is 
a general sales tax. A tax comparable to the Mississippi sales 
tax would produce, under present conditions, probably between 
fifteen and twenty million dollars annually; and this sum, if 
earmarked for education, would make it possible not only to 
equalize our schools over a period of years but to improve our 
schools to the point that they would approximate the schools 
in the wealthier states. There are many objections to a general 
sales tax, but there is no disputing the fact that such a tax 
would bring in a larger sum of money than could reasonably 
be raised from any other source. It would also rest on a broader 
base and would touch many who now pay little or no taxes to 
the state. Part of the money could and should be used for higher 
L 
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education but the lion's share of it should go to the public 
schools. 
The task is not hopeless if the fads are realized and coura-
geously faced. Let us hope that the people of South Carolina and 
the other Southern States will meet this challenge with courage, 
fortitude, and wisdom and a determination to afford to their 
youth educational opportunities inferior to none in the nation. 
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CONSTITUTION 
I 
The name of this organization shall be The South Carolina Historical 
Association. 
II 
The objects of the Association shall be to promote historical studies 
in the State of South Carolina; to bring about a closer relationship among 
persons living in this State who are interested in history; and to encourage 
the preservation of historical records. 
III 
Any person approved by the executive committee may become a 
member by paying $2.00 and after the first year may continue a member 
by paying an annual fee of $2.00. 
IV 
The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary and 
treasurer who shall be elected by ballot at each regular annual meeting. 
A list of nominations shall be presented by the executive committee, but 
nominations from the floor may be made. The officers shall have the 
duties and perform the functions customarily attached to their respective 
offices with such others as may from time to time be prescribed. 
V 
There shall be an executive committee made up of the officers and 
of two other members elected by ballot for a term of three years; at the 
first election; however, one shall be elected for two years. Vacancies shall 
be filled by election in the same manner at the annual meeting following 
their occurrence. Until such time they shall be filled by appointment by 
the president. The duties of the executive committee shall be to fix the 
date and place of the annual meeting, to attend to the publication of the 
proceedings of the Association, to prepare a program for the annual meet-
ings, to prepare a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as 
provided in Article IV, and such other duties as may be from time to time 
assigned to them by the Association. There shall be such other com-
mittees as the president may appoint, or be instructed to appoint, by reso-
lution of the Association. 
VI 
There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and 
place appointed by the executive committee. 
VII 
The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be known 
as The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association. It shall 
contain the constitution, by-laws, and minutes of the annual meeting to-
gether with such papers and documents selected by the executive com-
mittee as may be published without incurring a deficit. It is understood 
that all papers read at the annual meeting become the property of the 
Association except as otherwise may be provided by the executive com-
mittee. The executive committee shall annually elect an editor of the 
Proceedings. He shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and 
shall be a member of the executive committee, but without vote. 
VIII 
This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers present at the annual business meeting. 
. \ 
.. 
MEMBERS OF THE AssocIATION 
~f! Alexander, Thomas B ..................................... Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. Baker, Mary NeeL .......................... Greenwood High School, Greenwood, S. C. 
'\ Barnwell, Robert W., Jr ............................. Tusculum College, Greenville, Tenn. Barnwell, Mrs. Robert W., Jr ................................................... Greenville, Tenn. 
Barton, Mrs. A. T ....................................... Girls' High School, Anderson, S. C. 
Blake, Eugene H ......................................................................... Greenwood, S. C. 
Bolen, C. Waldron ............................................ Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. 
Boyd, Ruth .......................................... Greenville High School, Greenville, S. C. 
Brewster, Lawrence F ..... East Carolina Teachers College, Greenville, N. C. 
Brown, Marshall W ............. President, Presbyterian College, Clinton, S. C. 
Burts, Robert M., Jr ................................... Presbyterian College, Clinton, S. C. 
Calhoun, Mrs. A. D ..................................................................... Greenwood, S. C. 
Callcott, W. H ..................... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Carlisle, C. H ................................................. Erskine College, Due West, S. C. 
Carpenter, C. H ................................................. Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. 
Chambers, Catherine ...................................................................... Greenville, S. C. 
Cauthen, Charles E ................................... Wofford College, Spartanburg, S. C. 
Childs, Mrs. Arney R. ........ University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Collins, Mrs. C. C ................................... Dreher High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Cooley, Ruth ...................................... , ............. Columbia College, Columbia, S. C. 
Copeland, J. Isaac ........ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. 
Daniel, Lucia .................................. University High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Davidson, Elizabeth H ..................................... Coker College, Hartsville, S. C. 
Davis, Henry C ......................... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Deschamps, Margaret Burr ............................ Emory University, Emory, Ga. 
de Treville, Catherine ........ Greenville Senior High School, Greenville, S. C. 
Doyle, Oscar H ............................................................................... Anderson, S. C. 
Easterby, J. Harold ................ S. C. Historical Commission, Columbia, S. C. 
Eastwood, A. J ............................................. Limestone College, Gaffney, S. C. 
Epting, Carl L ................................................... Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. 
Ferrell, C. M ......................... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Galloway, Helen Brice ........ Greenville Senior High School, Greenville, S. C. 
Gentry, Claude Dewey, Jr ..................... Dreher High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Gilpatrick, D. H ....................................... Furman University, Greenville, S. C. 
Green, E. L ..................................................................................... Columbia, S. C. 
Gregorie, Anne King ................................................................ Mt. Pleasant, S. C. 
Hagan, Helen .................................................. Coker College, Hartsville, S. C. 
Hatfield, G. Elliott ........................................ Columbia College, Columbia, S. C. 
Hennig, Mrs. Julian .................................................................... Columbia, S. C. 
Hollis, Daniel W ..................... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Jones, Lewis P ........................................... Wofford College, Spartanburg, S. C. 
Jordan, Mildred ........................................ Dreher High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Kibler, Lillian ........................................ Converse College, Spartanburg, S. C. 
Kirk, Mrs. L. Roger .............................. Columbia High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Lander, E. M., Jr ............................................. Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. 
Latham, George .................... Greenville Senior High School, Greenville, S. C. 
Lesesne, J. M ................................................... Erskine College, Due West, S. C. 
Lewis, Archibald R ................... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Logan, S. Frank. ..................................... Wofford College, Spartanburg, S. C. 
Macaulay, Neill W ......................................................................... Columbia, S. C. 
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Magill, Sadie ...................................... Columbia High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Mauldin, Guy E ......................................................................... Washington, D. C. 
McCants, E. C ................................................................................. Anderson, S. C. 
McSwain, Dorothy ................................ Columbia High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Mellette, Mary L ........................................................................... Greenville, S. C. 
Meriwether, Robert L ............. University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Moffit, James W ..................................... Furman University, Greenville, S. C. 
Ochs, Robert D ......................... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Oliphant, Mrs. Albert D. (Mary Simms) ............................ Greenville, S. C. 
Overton, William C ............................... Columbia High School, Columbia, S. C. 
Patrick, Mrs. C. S ............... Calhoun-Clemson High School, Clemson, S. C. 
Patterson, William H ......... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Pearlstine, Hanna ................................ Columbia High· School, Columbia, S. C. 
Perlstein, Nancy Mclntosh ...................................................... St. Matthews, S. C. 
Prior, Granville T ................................................. The Citadel, Charleston, S. C. 
Reams, J. Mitchell... ........................... Clemson College Library, Clemson, S. C. 
Rice, Harvey I., Jr ....................... College of Charleston, Charleston, S. C. 
Richards, Jane Leighton ........................ Converse College, Spartanburg, S. C. 
Salley, Mrs. V. M ........................................... Columbia College, Columbia, S. C. 
Sims, Henry R ........................... President, Winthrop College, Rock Hill, S. C. 
Skardon, Alvin W., Jr ....................... University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 
Smith, Dorothy ................................ Richland County Library, Columbia, S. C. 
Stone, Richard G ..................... President, Saint Mary's School 
and Junior College, Raleigh, N. C. 
Tilghman, Mrs. H. L ........................................................................... Marion, S. C. 
Todd, Jean Kennedy ...................................... Lander College, Due West, S. C. 
Townsend, Leah ........................ : ..................................................... Florence, S. C. 
Tucker, Robert C ....................................... Furman University, Greenville, S. C. 
Tuttle, J. E ....................................................... Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. 
Vann, Mrs. J. D., Jr. (Sybil W.) .... Greenville High School, Greenville, S. C. 
Varn, Sallie ........................................................................................ Oakland, N. C. 
Venable, Austin L ..................................... Winthrop College, Rock Hill, S. C. 
Wallace, D. D ........................................... Wofford College, Spartanburg, S. C. 
Watson, Harry L ................................... The Index-Journal, Greenwood, S. C. 
Webb, William E ........................................... Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. 
Wienefeld, Robert H ............... University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C. 
Wilken, Hazel C ..................................... Rivers High School, Charleston, S. C. 
Wilkes, M. R ............................................................................... Washington, D. C. 
Williams, Jack K ............................................... Clemson College, Clemson, S. C. 
Williamson, Gustavus G ............. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 
Wolfe, J. Harold ...................................... Winthrop College, Rock Hill, S. C. 
Woody, Robert H ........................................... Duke University, Durham, N. C. 
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